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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF UZBEKISTAN AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF CENTRAL ASIA

by

Atalay Karakurt

December 1997

Thesis Advisor:

Robert Edward Looney

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Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1997		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF UZBEKISTAN AND POLITICAL STABILITY OF CENTRAL ASIA				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR Karakurt, Atalay					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
<p>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</p> <p>Uzbekistan with distinguished characteristics appears as a key state to influence the political stability of Central Asian states and the Russian Federation in the near future. Its ethnically heterogeneous population, chronic economic problems inherited from the USSR and the richness of natural energy resources make Uzbekistan the key state of the region.</p> <p>The main focus of this thesis is to offer a detailed analysis of Uzbekistan's ethnic structure and its probable effects on the political stabilization of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation. A secondary objective is to explore how Uzbekistan could continue to provide a peace among its population and thereby prevent the destabilization of other states.</p> <p>Results of this study present a promising future for Uzbekistan, and therefore for the stability of the region. Nevertheless, the study also shows that the continuity of stability depends on the understanding of current realities by other concerned states and ethnic minorities of Uzbekistan.</p>					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Uzbekistan, Central Asia, Transition.				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 98	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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**ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF UZBEKISTAN AND POLITICAL
STABILITY OF CENTRAL ASIA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1997

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ABSTRACT

Uzbekistan with distinguished characteristics appears as a key state to influence the political stability of Central Asian states and the Russian Federation in the near future. Its ethnically heterogeneous population, chronic economic problems inherited from the USSR and the richness of natural energy resources make Uzbekistan the key state of the region.

The main focus of this thesis is to offer a detailed analysis of Uzbekistan's ethnic structure and its probable effects on the political stabilization of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation. A secondary objective is to explore how Uzbekistan could continue to provide a peace among its population and thereby prevent the destabilization of other states.

Results of this study present a promising future for Uzbekistan, and therefore for the stability of the region. Nevertheless, the study also shows that the continuity of stability depends on the understanding of current realities by other concerned states and ethnic minorities of Uzbekistan.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Ministry of National Defense or the Turkish Government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

From the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, emerged as one of the independent states of Central Asia. All of these states inherited a problematic legacy. Artificial boundaries, ethnically heterogeneous populations, centrally planned economies, and environmental degradation remained as problems from the USSR. Uzbekistan, among these newly independent states, appears as a key state to influence the political stability of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation in the near future.

Uzbekistan's potential effectiveness is the result of its geographic location, ethnic structure, and population characteristics. With the largest population of Central Asian states, Uzbekistan occupies the heart of Central Asia. Minorities, such as Russians, Kazaks, Tajiks, and Tatars constitute almost seventeen percent of Uzbekistan's twenty-two-million population. Also, approximately three million Uzbeks live in the neighboring states including Afghanistan.

This thesis accomplishes three objectives. First, it offers a detailed analysis of Uzbekistan's ethnic structure and the probable consequences of political destabilization of the Central Asian states and the Russian Federation. Second, the thesis analyzes how Uzbekistan could continue to provide for peace among its ethnic minorities and thereby prevent the destabilization of other concerned states. Third, the thesis highlights the importance of Uzbekistan's well-being for Central Asian states and the Russian Federation.

First of all, an ethnic conflict in Uzbekistan is possible because of the existence of ethnic groups. Second, the initiation of ethnic conflicts depends on the existence or emergence of certain factors. Following these assumptions is the main question of the thesis: Which factors are necessary for the initiation of ethnic conflicts? The answer that is the main argument of the thesis is that ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan will initiate as a result of competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources. Additionally, ethnic groups' feeling toward each other, cultural and daily relations, and perceptions will very much affect the likelihood and the intensity of ethnic conflicts.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter I is an introduction, including theories about ethnic conflicts, economic progress, and social stability. Chapter II has three parts. First, it introduces Uzbekistan and the limits of its geographical sources. Second, it provides a background for the feelings, perceptions, and claims of the ethnic groups. And third, it examines the reasons for initiation of ethnic conflicts and their development patterns by studying recent conflicts in Uzbekistan.

Chapter III examines the current ethnic, human rights, and social issues in Uzbekistan: relations and feelings of ethnic groups, the human rights policy of Uzbekistan, and developing social problems. Chapter IV analyzes the probable reactions of neighboring countries to ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan. This chapter explains that the probable reactions of neighboring countries and the Russian Federation will not be sufficient to cause the hostilities to cease once the ethnic groups come into conflict. Rather, their reactions will tend to spread the conflict throughout the region. Furthermore, Chapter IV speculates that a failure of the Russian Federation to protect the Russian-speaking minorities may result in the political destabilization of the Russian Federation.

Chapter V examines the economic situation of Uzbekistan and offers that it is the modest economic progress that has been providing a peace between ethnic groups in Uzbekistan since the fall of the USSR. This chapter also analyzes the requirements of the continuity of economic progress of Uzbekistan. Finally, Chapter VI provides an overview of the relationship between the economic progress and the political stability of Uzbekistan

B. THEORY

1. The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts

The contemporary literature on ethnic conflicts¹ is derived from the two main viewpoints: primordialism and instrumentalism.² Their explanations about the reasons of ethnic conflicts constitute the basic difference between them. Primordialists hold the view that political and economic changes cannot erase the ethnical identities of groups. Two or more ethnic groups can come together and establish a nation-state, but their identities cannot cease to exist even if their nation-state has politically or economically developed. In time, their suppressed identities may be revived by a number of causes. This revival of ethnic groups' identities in combination with the causes which spur the revival inevitably initiates ethnic conflicts. According to Anthony Smith, the causes of ethnic revival are the growth of

¹ The literature on conflicts offers a large number of theories, such as *individual assessment and calculation* of Thomas Hobbes, *crowd mentality or collective innovation* of irrationalists, *value integration* of Talcott Parsons, *relative deprivation* and *psychological* theories of Aristotle, John Dollard, James C. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, *group contention* of Karl Marx, Vilfredo Pareto, and Charles Tilly. James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). However, for the sake of clarity, it is necessary to distinguish ethnic conflicts from the general concept of civil violence.

² Anthony D. Smith, "Conflict and Collective Identity: Class, *Ethnic* and Nation," in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, eds., International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986) 63-84 and Ted Robert Gurr., Minorities at Risk (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 124.

intelligentsia, the impact of the modern, rational or scientific state on society, the impact of nationalist ideology of the state, and the ethnic groups' desire to become the owner of their own states.³ Therefore, to primordialists, the main cause of ethnic conflicts is the existence of two or more ethnic groups in one nation-state.

Instrumentalists, on the other hand, primarily argue that the scarcity of resources in one particular modernized state invites a competition between various groups, which identify themselves according to their economic class or ethnic ties.⁴ The viewpoint of Marxist instrumentalists who regard the economic class ties as the principal denominator of competing groups is excluded from this thesis because Marxism itself proved that it was a poor paradigm to understand human relations. The other instrumentalists who regard the importance of ethnic ties, also, accept ethnic groups as the rational political actors, and perceive the competition of ethnic groups as the rational pursuit of their interests. Therefore, ethnic instrumentalists argue that because ethnic groups are rational actors their existence in one nation-state does not necessarily cause conflicts among them. Peaceful coexistence can be achieved by equal concession and accommodation. However, ethnic instrumentalists do not eliminate the probability of conflicts between ethnic groups. They argue that peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups depends on continuous surveillance and management of accommodation by state authorities.⁵

Other ethnic conflict theories were also formulated in recent years, especially after the beginning of various ethnic conflicts in Europe in the 1990s. However, except for the theory of Barry R. Posen, these theories reflect the previous viewpoints of primordialists or instrumentalists. According to Posen, the security dilemma of ethnically or religiously defined groups emerging from old multi-ethnic empires, namely the USSR and Yugoslavia, affects their inter-group relations. Posen argues that because the main reason of conflict between these groups is their fear from each other, it is necessary for the international community to make these groups feel secure.⁶ Jack Snyder, one of the other recent conflict theorists, supports Posen's security dilemma formulation, but he also adheres to the primordialist viewpoint. He argues that it is the aggressive nationalism that causes national conflicts.⁷ Aggressive nationalism

³ Anthony D. Smith, "Conflict and Collective Identity: Class, *Ethnie* and Nation," 68-71.

⁴ Ibid., 65.

⁵ Milton J. Esman, "Political and Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990) 53-61.

⁶ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol.35, No.1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.

⁷ Professor Jack Snyder's 'national conflicts' include ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts among the groups of one particular state. Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," *Survival*, Vol.35, No.1 (Spring 1993): 5-26.

produces conflicts because of the following reasons: (1) security dilemma of groups, (2) intensification of (ethnic) nationalistic ideology of one ethnic group, especially at the times of military or economic threats to the state, and (3) ethnic definition of nationality which denies citizenship and protection to other ethnically defined groups in the same state. However, he also argues that the main cause of aggressive nationalism is the failure of states to meet military and economic threats to their people in combination with restrictions on political participation of the other groups in the state's governing structure.

The others combine previous approaches.⁸ Stuart J. Kaufman, for example, formulates a theory that the "ancient hatred" of primordialists, "inter-ethnic security dilemma" of Posen, and "manipulation of belligerent leaders" are the causes of ethnic conflicts. He also shows us that the sources of hostility between ethnic populations are the following: ethnically defined grievances, demographic threats, negative ethnic stereotypes, a history of ethnic domination, ethnic symbols, a reciprocal fear of group extinction, a de facto situation of anarchy, the military means to fight, and the political space for ethnic outbidding.⁹

However, according to Jack Snyder as one of the source of ethnic conflicts, the "ancient hatred" approach misleads us.¹⁰ Additionally, in the conclusion of *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Professor Kupchan writes that,¹¹

To be sure, historical tension between Slovaks and Czechs played a role in precipitating the split of their country. So too did memories of past injustices intensify violence during the breakup of Yugoslavia. But in both these cases, historical claims and counterclaims need not have dominated the political discourse. . . . Past injustices indeed played a role in intensifying nationalist sentiments, but historical memories were more the tool of the propagandist than the original source of ethnic rivalry.

The security dilemma, a phenomenon of realist international relations paradigm, also, cannot help us to understand the specific reasons of ethnic conflicts. It depends on the absence of a sovereign

⁸ David A Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," and Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," *International Security*, Vol.21, No.2 (Fall 1996) and Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

⁹ Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 108-9 and 113.

¹⁰ Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," 5.

¹¹ Charles A. Kupchan, "Conclusion," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995) 182.

that causes anarchy. In this anarchical situation, every ethnic group tries to enhance its own security that causes other ethnic groups' reactions in the same manner. At the end, ethnic groups' reactionary actions to each other spiral into ethnic conflict.¹² The security dilemma may explain the ethnic conflicts where the state structure or sovereign has recently collapsed, and certainly offers a strong tool to understand the relations between sovereign states. However, it makes an insignificant contribution to examine the Fergana-1989 conflict in Uzbekistan, which occurred suddenly against a small minority before the fall of the USSR.

The "manipulation of belligerent leaders," also, does not offer a useful explanation to the sources of ethnic conflicts since leaders cannot mobilize masses without "a wide and a deep sense of grievance among ordinary people."¹³ Even Kaufman says, "People do not engage in ethnic violence unless they are hostile."¹⁴

On the other hand, Lake and Rothchild argue that ethnic conflicts most often occur as a consequence of collective fears of the future. To them, "collective fears of the future arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups." They, also, say that groups behave rationally in general, but they may be irrational under certain conditions.¹⁵ One more explanation of the causes of ethnic conflicts comes from Donald Horowitz. He writes that,¹⁶

Where there is a split between indigenous and immigrant groups, it tends to coincide with the split between backward and advanced groups. Backward-indigenous groups 'feel under siege in their own home,' a powerful feeling that often calls up determined and violent political activity. Where backwardness and indigenouness conjoin, the configuration of political claims and responses is predictable.

Consequently, according to their main viewpoints, the scholars of this field offer a number of causes of ethnic conflicts. However, as it is put by Michael E. Brown, Senior Fellow in U.S. Security Policy and Editor of *Survival* at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London,¹⁷

¹² Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 27-9.

¹³ Ted Robert Gurr and Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparisons and Policy Implications," in Dana P. Eyre, ed., *Course Reader of NS 3011* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, Winter 1996) 334.

¹⁴ Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 112.

¹⁵ Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," 41.

¹⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) 213. (Emphasis mine.)

¹⁷ Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 12.

If political science was as advanced as the physical sciences, it might be possible to integrate these . . . factors in an overarching theory of the causes of ethnic conflicts. Sadly, that is not possible. It is not yet clear what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the initiation of ethnic hostilities, nor is there a rigorous understanding of why some conflicts are more intense than others.

Considering the characteristics of Uzbekistan as it is advised by Khazanov,¹⁸ I argue that the main cause of an ethnic conflict is the scarcity of resources that simultaneously cause the deterioration of the living conditions of the population and a competition between them for these scarce resources. When people lose their current wealth sources (such as earnings, jobs, lands, herds, and houses) they begin to seek the cause of their losses. If there are ethnically defined groups among these frustrated populations, they may try to eliminate these ethnic groups on the grounds that the existence of these ethnic groups is the cause of their misery. In other words, a “competition” for scarce resources begins between them. The lack of cultural contacts between ethnic groups and their hostile or contemptuous feelings toward each other, also, enhances the likelihood of an ethnic conflict. At the same time, ethnic groups may revive or invent “symbols,” such as religious flags and figures, find “belligerent leaders,” and create “ethnic stereotypes.”

2. Economic Progress and Social Problems

The Republic of Uzbekistan was the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR) until the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, the Republic of Uzbekistan inherited severe social and economic problems that were common to all other socialist states. The cause of these problems was the centrally planned economic structure of socialist states. For that reason, economists’ theories for economic recovery and development of former socialist states offer an economic reform for transition from centrally planned economy to a market economy. They suggest that the implementation of three main economic principles--stabilization, liberalization, and privatization--is necessary to be successful in transition. An institutional reform to provide a legal framework for the implementation of these principles is another requirement for success.¹⁹

¹⁸ A. M. Khazanov, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, writes that, “National movements are always shaped by the distinctive sociopolitical and economic features of the countries where they take place.” Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) 104.

¹⁹ Michael Mandelbaum, “Introduction,” in Shafiqul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) 3.

In addition to these principles and institutional reform, Professor Robert Campbell suggests two more measures: “opening the economy to the external world,” and “a system of social protection against the costs the transition imposed on the population.”²⁰ Campbell believes that the future of economic reform primarily depends on the behavior of population. He predicts three outcomes according to the probable popular reactions: a social revolution as a result of economic problems of transition, abortion of reform in favor of populist policies, or a success in transition to market economy without a social revolution and populist policies, but with the implementation of necessary social protection.²¹

This is the dilemma of transition countries. On the one hand, the application of the three main principles on deteriorated social and economic structures inherited from the socialist era will inevitably create a resentment among the population that may cause a social revolution in the short term. On the other hand, in the long term, aborting reform in favor of populist policies will also result in social explosion or revolution. In the case of Uzbekistan, as a result of social resentments, there is also the probability of ethnic conflicts that are ready to complicate further the transition from plan to market.

The World Bank recommends a social policy to transition countries. The goals of this policy are the elimination of their current social problems inherited from the socialist system and the protection of population from the costs of transition.²² First of all, these countries must firmly and consistently pursue economic reform policy in order to obtain high growth rates in economic development that eventually will eliminate discontent by decreasing unemployment and increasing employee benefits. Secondly, providing enough social security measures, such as an effective health-care system, sufficient pensions and minimum wages, they must ease the pain of transition and the current social problems of their populations. According to *World Development Report 1996*,²³

In many countries [of transition] the largest problem, both politically and in terms of demand on public resources, is state pensions. Generous access to pensions is one way of cushioning the impact of transition on a generation that was prevented from accumulating wealth in the previous system and has no opportunity to save in the new market system.

²⁰ Robert W. Campbell, “Economic Reform in the USSR and its Successor States,” in Shafiqul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States, 106.

²¹ Ibid., 135 and 113.

²² The World Bank, “People and Transition,” in World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington DC, 1996) 66-84.

²³ The World Bank, “Conclusions-and the Unfinished Agenda,” in World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington DC, 1996) 144.

However, in the end the effectiveness of this policy depends on government revenues sufficiently available to spend for social security requirements. During the communist system, revenues of transition countries mainly came from taxes, union grants, and state enterprises.²⁴ Today, union grants cannot be taken into account. State enterprises' former contribution to revenues may be replaced by revenues from these enterprises' privatization. Nevertheless, revenues from privatization of unprofitable and outdated state enterprises may not be enough to meet government expenditures.

Additionally, the current economic structure of Uzbekistan depends on agriculture. A high rate of population growth, also, requires continuous expansion of this agricultural structure. However, environmental problems do not allow further expansion of agriculture. It is obvious that the consequence of restrictions on agriculture will be a substantial increase in unemployment which will certainly cause ethnic conflicts. On the other hand, Uzbekistan possesses significant amount of other natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, that have not been opened to the external world.

Consequently, considering Uzbekistan's economic and social situation and rich oil and natural gas resources, I argue that the only possible way for Uzbekistan to gain enough revenues and create additional employment opportunities in order to alleviate the cost of transition and prevent ethnic conflicts is to export oil and natural gas.

²⁴ The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC, 1993) 277, Table 4.1: Summary of Fiscal Operations for 1987-1991.

II. UZBEKISTAN AND THE UZBEKS

First, this chapter introduces Uzbekistan and the limits of its geographical sources. Second, it provides a background for the feelings, perceptions, and claims of the ethnic groups. Third, it examines the reasons for initiation of ethnic conflicts and their development patterns by studying recent conflicts in Uzbekistan.

A. GEOGRAPHY

The Republic of Uzbekistan is located in the middle of Central Asian states (Figure 2.1). Covering 447,400 square kilometers (172,700 square miles, slightly larger than California), it lies along the ancient silk road between Europe and the Far East. It is surrounded on the north and northwest by Kazakstan (2,203 km); on the east by Kyrgyzstan (1,099 km) and Tajikistan (1,161 km); on the south by Afghanistan (137 km); on the southwest by Turkmenistan (1,621 km).²⁵

Almost three-fifths of Uzbekistan's land consists of steppe, desert, and semi-arid terrain. From west to east, Uzbekistan is covered by the arid Ustyurt plateau, the southern part of the Aral Sea, the delta of the Amudarya on the south of the Aral Sea, the Kyzylkum Desert, the valleys of Zeravshan, Qashqadarya and Surkhandarya rivers, and the Fergana Valley. The Ustyurt plateau on the southwest of the Aral Sea contains salt lakes, salt marshes and sand. There is no running water on the plateau, and rain is nonexistent. Between the Aral Sea, the Syrdarya, the Zeravshan Valley, and the Amudarya lies the Kyzylkum, the second largest desert of Central Asia. Long and hot summers, and mild winters are the characteristics of Uzbekistan's climate. Rainfall averages eight inches per year, and temperatures range from 32 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter to 130 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer.

²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, (Washington, DC: Office of Public and Agency Information, 1995) 447.



Figure 2.1 Uzbekistan²⁶

Central Asia's two major rivers, the Amudarya on the south and Syrdarya on the north, flow through Uzbekistan to the Aral Sea. The Amudarya begins in the Pamirs in Tajikistan. It runs, first, along the border of Afghanistan with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, then, along much of Uzbekistan's southwestern border with Turkmenistan. While the Amudarya flows through Turkmenistan, it is fed by the Surkhandarya, the Qashqadarya, and the Zeravshan River that come from Tajikistan through Uzbekistan. At the same time, almost 20 percent water of the Amudarya flows to south Turkmenistan by way of the Karakum Canal, which was built at the end of the 1950s. The second major river, the

²⁶ National Technical Information Service, *Uzbekistan: An Economic Profile* (Springfield, 1993) vi.

Syrdarya, begins as the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan. Later, merging with Karadarya, it becomes the Syrdarya and flows through the Fergana Valley and Kazakstan to the Aral Sea.²⁷

Valleys and oases along the Amudarya, the Syrdarya, and their tributaries provide the only suitable settlement areas and agricultural lands to the population of Uzbekistan. The largest and most economically important one is the Fergana Valley in the east bounded on three sides by mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It stretches 300 kilometers and reaches 170 kilometers in width. Its center is mainly desert and desert steppe, but its flanks contain many loess-rich foothills and mountain slopes. Most of the Fergana Valley lies in Uzbekistan, but in the northeast it extends into Kyrgyzstan and in the south it continues into Tajikistan. In Uzbekistan, the valley is divided into three distinct regions around the cities of Andijan, Fergana, and Namangan. With a population of seven million people, the narrow valley is the most densely populated region in Uzbekistan²⁸ The other important settlement areas of Uzbekistan comprise the valley of Zeravshan River between Samarkand, Nawoiy, and Bukhara, the valleys of Surkhandarya and Qashqadarya, the Khiva (Khorezm) oasis on the Amudarya, the lands around the Aral Sea, and Tashkent on the Syrdarya.

The Aral Sea on the Uzbekistan-Kazakstan border is fed only by the Amudarya and the Syrdarya. These two rivers' water resources total to 127.5 cubic kilometers for the average year. However, since the late 1950s, over 75 percent of these resources has been used by irrigation channels for the purpose of expanding the agricultural hectarage devoted in large part to cotton and also to rice.²⁹ Moreover, in some dry years, the irrigation percentage nears to 100 percent (Table 2.1).³⁰

²⁷ Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*, (London: Routledge, 1992) 83.

²⁸ Ibid., 81; Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?*, (London : Zed Books, 1994) 7-8, 84; Ahmed Rashid, "The Islamic Factor; Uzbekistan," in *World Press Review*, Vol.40, No.3 (March 1993): 45.

²⁹ Michael H. Glantz, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Igor Zonn, "Tragedy in the Aral Sea Basin: Looking Back to Plan Ahead?" in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Central Asia. Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 167.

³⁰ Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," 83.

Table 2.1 Inflow into the Aral Sea,³¹
(cubic kilometers)

	<u>Amudarya</u>	<u>Syrdarya</u>	<u>Total</u>
1959	40.0	18.3	58.3
1968	28.9	7.2	36.1
1977	7.2	0.4	7.7
1989	N/A	N/A	4.3
1996³²	N/A	N/A	1.0

Because of this excessive irrigation, since the early 1960s the Aral Sea has shrunk by more than two-thirds and continues to recede. In some places it has retreated more than 150 kilometers. Ports such as Muynak, which used to support a fishing industry employing 50,000 people in the 1960s, are now separated from what is left of the Aral by up to 145 km of desert.³³

Besides the rising mineralization level in the water of the Aral Sea, wind storms containing salt and dust are some of the other results of this dramatic recession. Moreover, the contents of salt and dust, which are being carried by these storms, changes the Aral Sea affair to a serious international problem that requires common efforts of Central Asian states and international organizations. Dust and salt from the dried-up sea bed includes the remnants of fertilizers, defoliants, and pesticides, as well as heavy metals, such as lead, aluminum, and cadmium, formerly trapped in the sea mud. The dried-up sea bottom now covers an area of more than 30,000 square kilometers, and salt and dust storms arising from its surface carry some 75 million tons annually³⁴ which is equal to half a ton of salt and dust on each hectare around the Aral Sea.³⁵ The heavier salt particles settle within the radius of 400-500 kilometers while the lighter particles are carried to much greater distances. Some of this noxious material reach the fertile

³¹ Ibid., 87, Table 4.1.

³² Amembassy Tashkent, "Uzbekistan: Visit to Kharezmi and Karakalpakistan," August 8, 1996, at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/960808uz.html>.

³³ Daniel Butler, "Water the Next Source of Trouble," Euromoney World Link Magazine, November/December 1995 at <http://emwl.oyster.co.uk/conternts/publications/worldlink/wl.95>.

³⁴ Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia and the Aral Sea Problem," 86.

³⁵ Douglas Busvine, "World Tries to Soften Impact of Aral Sea's Demise," Reuters World Service, September 17, 1995.

Fergana Valley and Georgia on the Black Sea coast.³⁶ According to Ze'ev Wolfson of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Aral's toxic salts fall with the rain in Latvia, Belorussia, and Poland.³⁷

Naturally, the Aral Sea disaster primarily has been afflicting the population living around the Aral Sea in Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan they are the 1.45 million people of the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic of Uzbekistan. Since their lands and even their piped water is heavily polluted, in 1995, 97 percent the women of Karakalpakstan were classified as anemic as a result of lead poisoning. As well as anemia, the people of Karakalpakstan also suffer from rising rates of kidney and thyroid disease, and of esophageal, stomach, and liver cancers. In parts of Karakalpakstan life expectancy is twenty years less than the average for the rest of the former Soviet Union. Four out of five are born anemic, and one in twenty has a congenital disorder. Infant mortality exceeds 80 per thousand live births in places, and averages about 45 per thousand. This is 50 percent above the average for Uzbekistan, and the highest rate in the former Soviet Union.³⁸

Although Central Asians have recognized the importance of the desiccation of the Aral Sea since the early 1980s, they have not yet been able to implement any regulation to stop the desiccation. On June 23, 1990, the presidents of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration, stating that the growing deficit and pollution of water resources put the Aral Sea basin on the edge of ecological ruin that necessitates serious efforts of the central government of the USSR.³⁹ Just after the independence of Central Asian states, a joint statement issued by the water management authorities of each state in October 1991, said that "there was an inevitability of a complex situation due to an increasing water deficit and aggravation of ecological tensions in the basin of the Aral Sea."⁴⁰ In March 1992, the five Central Asian states agreed to equal rights to water resource-use and equal responsibility for its conservation, but no measures could be adopted to improve the ecological situation in the Aral basin except for a guarantee that the Aral Sea would receive 10.5

³⁶ James Crichtlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 82.

³⁷ Ze'ev Wolfson, *The Geography of Survival: Ecology in the Post-Soviet Era*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994) 39.

³⁸ Fred Pearce, "Poisoned Waters: The Aral Sea," in *New Scientist*, October 21, 1995, p.29; Stephen Reynolds, "Occupational and Environmental Health in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan," *American Industrial Hygiene Association Journal*, Vol.57, No.12 (December 1996): 1096-1102; Amebassy Tashkent, "Uzbekistan: Visit to Kharezmi and Karakalpakstan," August 8, 1996, at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/960808uz.html>.

³⁹ Michael H. Glantz, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Igor Zonn, "Tragedy in the Aral Sea Basin: Looking Back to Plan Ahead?" 166.

⁴⁰ Andrei Ivanov, "Aral Sea Receives European Funding," *Inter Press Service*, June 23, 1996.

cubic kilometers of water from both rivers annually. In March 1993, an agreement was reached in principle to improve the situation in the Aral Sea basin, and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) was set up. They also established a committee-Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS)-to coordinate their efforts.⁴¹

In 1995, an international conference under the auspices of the UN on sustainable development of the Aral Sea basin was held in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakistan. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met at this conference and signed the Nukus Declaration on September 20, 1995. Turkmenistan's president was not able to attend but has said he will sign at a later date. By the Nukus Declaration, they confirmed that,⁴²

The Aral Sea crisis is a result of unsustainable policies towards the environment and use of natural resources, and the principle cause has been the excessive withdrawal of water for irrigation along the courses of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers.

Finally, at a summit in Almaty on February 28, 1997, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan agreed to allot 0.3 percent of their countries' gross domestic product to the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Only Tajik President said that due to the difficult situation in his country, Tajikistan would not be able to contribute to the fund. In addition to these countries' contribution, the World Bank which has already granted \$41 million to the IFAS, is planning to provide a total of \$380 million by 2000 to help cope with the ecological disaster in the Aral Sea.⁴³ Also, the European Union which its executive European Commission has already provided \$5.89 million for a project on Water Resources Management and Agricultural Production is drawing up several schemes to help improve the environmental situation around the Aral Sea.⁴⁴ Consequently, the Aral Sea tragedy demonstrates the limits of geographic resources of Uzbekistan which would prohibit sustaining or expanding the agricultural sector which already requires an excessive amount of irrigation.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Amembassy Tashkent, "Nukus Declaration" on the Aral Sea Basin," September 26, 1995, at <http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/cables/0927uznk.html>.

⁴³ Merhat Sharipzan, "Central Asia: World Bank Pledges Funds to Save Aral Sea," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 28, 1997.

⁴⁴ Andrei Ivanov, "Aral Sea Receives European Funding," Inter Press Service, June 23, 1996.

B. HISTORY

In this section, the evolution of ethnic groups in Uzbekistan and their feelings toward each other will be examined. As aforementioned, feelings of ethnic groups are not the causes of the initiation of ethnic conflicts. However, as it is explained by Professor Kupchan,⁴⁵ these feelings (“past injustices,” “ancient hatred,” and “historical memories”) make ethnic groups ready to initiate conflicts and intensify conflicts after they are initiated.

1. Who Are the Uzbeks?

According to Porkhomovsky, (a senior researcher at the Institute of Linguistics, Russian Academy of Sciences,) Turkic tribes began to appear in Central Asia in the fifth or sixth century A. D.⁴⁶ Their first known state was the Gokturk Empire or the Great Turkish Kaganate which was founded in 552 A.D. Today, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are planning to celebrate the 1450th anniversary of the Gokturk Empire.⁴⁷ In 705, the Muslim Arabs came to Central Asia, conquered Bukhara and Samarkand, and introduced Islam to Central Asians.⁴⁸ Turkic tribes’ acceptance of Islam en masse began toward the end of ninth century. In the twelfth century, the Yeseviye path of Sufism, which was founded by Ahmed Yesevi began to flourish among the Turks of Central Asia all the way to Kazan, Azerbaijan, and Anatolia in the west⁴⁹ and to Fergana Valley, Bukhara, and Samarkand in the south. Yesevi died in 1166⁵⁰ near the city Yesi in southern region of modern-day Kazakstan.⁵¹ Almost two hundred years after, in the fourteenth century, Amir Timur of Uzbeks built a magnificent mausoleum to Ahmed Yesevi⁵² in Yesi which is still one of the most venerated holy places of pilgrimage of all Central Asia.⁵³

⁴⁵ See footnote 13.

⁴⁶ Victor Ya. Porkhomovsky, “Historical Origins of Interethnic Conflicts in Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” in Vitaly V. Naumkin, ed., Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994) 12.

⁴⁷ The Tashkent Declaration of Turkic states, October 21, 1996. Narodnoye Slavo, Tashkent, “Text of declaration at Turkic summit in Tashkent,” BBC Record Number: .00805*19961022*00320 in Global NewsBank.

⁴⁸ Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? 12.

⁴⁹ Kemal Karpat, “The old and new Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, Volume 12, No.4 (1993): 423.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 419.

⁵¹ Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 77.

⁵² Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, 36.

⁵³ Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986) 70.

From the second half of ninth century to 1220, several independent Turk and Persian Khanates and Emirates replaced each other in Central Asia: the Samanids (874-990), the Karahans (990-1212), and the Khorazmians (1157-1220) between Syrdarya and Amudarya; the Ghaznavids (989-1149) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northern India; the Seljuks (1040-1299) first in Turkmenistan and northern Afghanistan then in the Middle East and Anatolia.⁵⁴

All these states, except the Khorazmians, were created as tribal confederations under a dominant tribe and named after the dominant tribe or the leaders of the dominant tribes. In many cases, without relinquishing their original names, subject tribes also identified themselves with the name of the confederation. Thus the name of a powerful leader who subjugated the other tribes became the name of a nation in the course of time.⁵⁵

One more tribal confederation, the Mongols, which would eventually dominate Central Asia, central and eastern Europe, and the Middle East was constituted under the banner of Genghis Khan in Mongolia in 1206. In the next twelve years, this confederation included all the tribes that today make up the major ethnic groups in Central Asia except the Tajiks.⁵⁶ From 1237 onward, Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan (Figure 2.2) and the founder of the Golden Horde, began his expedition to the west to bring central and eastern Europe under the dominion of the Mongols. During Batu Khan's Hungarian Campaign, Sheiban, the fifth son of Juchi Khan, accompanied his brother Batu. After this campaign, Batu gave Sheiban the administration of the lands between the Caspian Sea, Aral Sea, Lake Balkash and the Urals, and four nomadic tribes⁵⁷ which were living there since the 6th century.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? 13; Kemal Karpat, "The old and new Central Asia," 415-425; Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols Part I The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1876) 5-8.

⁵⁵ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division I (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1880) 9; Zeki Velidi Togan, "The Origins of the Kazaks and the Ozbeks," in H. B. Paksoy, ed., Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 28-32; Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, 31.

⁵⁶ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols Part I The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks, 62-90.

⁵⁷ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division II (New York: Burt Franklin, ? first published in London in 1880) 978 and Edward Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, 7, Figure 1.1.

⁵⁸ Charles Warren Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) 7.




Figure 2.2 Genealogical Tree of the Rulers of the Golden Horde⁵⁹

In 1312, Uzbek Khan who was previously converted to Islam became the ruler of the Golden Horde. Uzbek Khan seized the throne from his uncle's pagan son, Tukul, with the help of Kutlugh Ming Timur. Because of his help, Uzbek Khan rewarded Kutlugh Timur by giving him the administration of Khorazm which comprised the Karakalpakistan (part of the modern-day Uzbekistan.) Uzbek Khan's term was one of the most glorious era of the Golden Horde. He was wise, powerful and very skillful. In

⁵⁹ Christopher Dawson, ed., *The Mongol Mission, Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955) Table-1; Michael Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1940) 550; Henry H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, 194; Howorth, *History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division II*, 874 and 978.

1313, he granted special favors to the Russian clergy that allowed the Russian church to achieve paramount influence in Russian life. Fifteen years later, he summoned Ivan Danilovitch, Prince of Moscow, conferred on him the Grand Principality of Russia, and killed his rivals. While Prince Ivan was a vassal of Uzbek Khan, the Russian church was moved from Vladimir to Moscow on August 4, 1326. From this date, Moscow became the political and religious capital of Russia. Uzbek Khan was also the father-in-law of the Muslims' Caliph and the son-in-law of the Byzantine Emperor. Moreover, according to a letter of the Pope John XXII, Uzbek Khan was well known for the kindness he had shown the other Christians and allowed the Catholic Church to introduce Christianity into the countries bordering on the Black Sea. Toward the end of Uzbek Khan's reign (1312-1340), his realm extended from Crimea to northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan.⁶⁰ At the same time, tribes living around the Aral Sea, Caspian Sea, Lake Balkash, and modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan that nominally belonged to Kutlugh Timur embraced the term Uzbek as their common name.

However, for Russians, the era of the Golden Horde was the beginning of "an inferiority complex and a need for revenge." As it is put by preeminent author of *Balkan Ghosts*,⁶¹

To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries. . . . And ever since the days of Ivan the Terrible [Ivan IV, one of the successor of Ivan I or Ivan Danilovitch], . . . , the Russians, burdened with an inferiority complex and a need for revenge, have been on the offensive against the Turkic peoples.

After the death of Berdibeg Khan in 1359, a strife ensued among Uzbek Khan's grandsons for the throne of the Golden Horde.⁶² During this chaos, in 1369, Amir Timur (1336-1405), one of the commanders of Kutlugh Timur's Samarkand Governor and the cousin of the leader of Uzbek Barlas tribe, proclaimed himself as the Amir of Transoxiana--the region between the Amudarya and the Syrdarya.⁶³ Between 1379 and 1402, Amir Timur expanded his rule from Samarkand to as far as Moscow. Timur died in 1405. Neither the empire nor the dynasty created by him lasted long. However, Amir Timur's era marked the beginning of an enormous sociological transformation that the Uzbek

⁶⁰ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division I, 148-72.

⁶¹ Robert D. Kaplan, "Shatter zone: Central Asia," The Atlantic, Vol. 269, No.4 (April 1992).

⁶² Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division I, 195.

⁶³ Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy, 411-34; Zeki Velidi Togan, "The Origins of the Kazaks and the Ozbeks," 30-7.

culture, customs, language (Uzbek)⁶⁴, “and the Genghisid political legacy were combined and retained along with Islamic identity and institutions and the sufi folk religion.”⁶⁵ This transformation continued after Amir Timur so that in the end the term “Uzbek” began to designate not a tribe or a tribal confederation, but a proto-nation, settled mostly in modern-day Uzbekistan and its near abroad, with distinctive cultural characteristics.

2. Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Consequences

In the course of time, without well-defined borders, three Uzbek states emerged on the territory of modern-day Uzbekistan, northern Turkmenistan, northern Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. They were the Khanate of Khiva around Khiva and the Aral sea, the Emirate of Bukhara centered on the Zeravshan Valley, and the Khanate of Kokand (Khokand or currently Quqon) in the Fergana Valley that came face to face with the Russian Empire in the middle of 19th century (Figure 2.3).



Figure 2.3 Central Asia in the Middle of 19th Century ⁶⁶

The penetration of the Russian Empire into the Khanates of Kokand and Khiva and the Bukhara Emirate began in 1853. It was not an invited or peaceful operation. The Russians first seized the fort of

⁶⁴ Karl H. Menges, “People, Languages, and Migrations,” in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 60-91.

⁶⁵ Kemal Karpat, “The old and new Central Asia,” 421.

⁶⁶ Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, 12.

Aq Meshit from the Khanate of Kokand in the summer of 1853. Kokand did not accept the loss of Aq Meshit quietly. In the fall of the same year it sent two contingents to re-conquer Aq Meshit; they were not successful, however. At the same time, the Russians seemed satisfied with the conquest of Aq Meshit and stopped their further expansion to the south. This created a short peace between the Russian Empire and Central Asian states.⁶⁷

The peace lasted until 1865. In November 1864, Prince Gorchakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, circulated a memorandum to the major Powers of Europe in order to explain the reasons of the coming Russian conquest of Central Asia. Prince Gorchakov declared that,⁶⁸

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing no fixed social organization. In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in the interests of the security of its frontiers and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whose turbulent and unsettled character make them undesirable neighbors.

However, thirty-five years after Prince Gorchakov's declaration, Governor General of Turkistan, Dukhovskii, observed that, "People speak of our civilizing role in Central Asia. At this juncture our cultural influence is remarkable for its nonexistence."⁶⁹

According to the explanations of Professor Fuller, the existence of independent Islamic states in Central Asia was another compelling reason for Russian expansion. Fuller tells us that, the rebellion of Muslim Sheikh Samil in the newly conquered Caucasian region [modern-day Chechnya] of the Russian Empire in the 1850s persuaded Russians to exterminate all the independent and Muslim Central Asian states.⁷⁰

In the next nine years after Gorchakov's formulation of the Russian interests in Central Asia, first Kokand, then Bukhara and Khiva Khanates became involuntary vassals of the Russian Empire. Also, some parts of their territories were occupied and made into the Turkistan province of the Russian Empire. The first major center in the region that was occupied by the Russians in 1865 was Tashkent.

⁶⁷ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division II, 833-5.

⁶⁸ Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha America, 1994) 304.

⁶⁹ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 170.

⁷⁰ William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992) 279.

Although Tashkent belonged to Kokand before the occupation, it was the Emir of Bukhara who asked the Russians to evacuate Tashkent and also waged a ‘guerrilla war’ against the occupation forces on the territory of the Khanate of Kokand.⁷¹ After two years of expansion, the conquered territories were reorganized so that the Governor-Generalship of Turkistan, with the capital at Tashkent, was established by a decree of Tsar Alexander II on July 11, 1867.⁷² In January 1868, the Turkistan Governor-General signed a commercial treaty with the Khan of Kokand, which placed Kokand under complete economic dependence to the Russian Empire. Four months after the conclusion of this treaty Bukhara proclaimed a holy war and attacked Turkistan Governor-General. Bukhara’s holy war lasted two months and was ended with the victory of Russians. On June 30, 1868, the defeated Emir was compelled to sign a peace treaty that put Bukhara under Russian suzerainty.⁷³ The Khanate of Khiva, unlike Bukhara and Kokand, could not strongly resist the Russian troops. Khiva, the capital with 18,000 residents, surrendered in May 1873 after two months of a weak and uncoordinated defense by the Khanates’ soldiers.⁷⁴ On August 12, 1873, the Khan of Khiva, who was newly appointed by Russians after the conquest, signed a peace treaty without arguing the conditions imposed by the Governor-General of Turkistan.⁷⁵

However, these treaties would not be able to establish peace in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand. It was not long after the signing of the last treaty that a rebellion, which was directed against the Emir of Bukhara and the Russian troops, broke out in the mountainous regions of eastern Bukhara.⁷⁶ Also, between 1873-74, there was intense unrest in the Khanate of Kokand. In July 1875, one more rebellion broke out in the Fergana Valley of Kokand. After this rebellion, St. Petersburg abolished the Khanate of Kokand and established the Fergana *oblasti* under the jurisdiction of Turkistan Government-General in 1876.⁷⁷

Although major reasons for Russian expansion into Central Asia were the civilization of “half-savage nomad populations” and the elimination of independent Muslim Khanates which were contributing uprisings in Russia’s newly annexed territories, the Russian government launched an

⁷¹ Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990) 11. Professor Rywkin does not use the term ‘guerrilla war’, but the “harassment of armed Bukharan bands.”

⁷² Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories,” 152.

⁷³ Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884,” in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 142.

⁷⁴ Henry H. Howorth, History of the Mongols: Part II The So-called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia Division II, 952-9.

⁷⁵ Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884,” 144-5.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 146-7.

economic policy beginning from 1869 that greatly contributed to the development of hatred among Central Asia's indigenous peoples toward the Russians. At the time of the Russian arrival, Central Asian farmers were primarily utilizing natural river flooding lands or areas watered by springs. Artificial irrigation by canal systems, which had been used in the Fergana Valley, and around Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva since tenth century, was not extensive. As a result of the American Civil War, which diminished the cotton exports to Russia from the USA, and the increasing cotton needs of Russia's rapidly growing industry in the 1860s, the Russians concluded that they should concentrate their efforts upon Central Asia's lands available for cotton farming in order to end the Russian Empire's reliance on sources of cotton supply outside the empire.⁷⁸ As it is shown in Table 2.2, during the American Civil War trade in raw and processed cotton with Central Asia increased by almost 300 percent.

Table 2.2 Russia's Trade with Central Asia, 1840-67 (Excluding Kazakstan)⁷⁹
(in million Rubles)

	<u>All Trade</u>	<u>Trade in Raw and Processed Cotton</u>
1840	1.7	1.3
1860	2.3	1.3
1867	8.5	6.0

In 1869, five years after the conquest of Tashkent and one year after the peace treaty with Bukhara, the first survey of irrigable lands was conducted in the Mirzachol Sahra west of Tashkent. In 1874, unpaid native laborers began digging a canal from the Syrdarya. In addition, there were other projects to increase the amount of irrigated lands.⁸⁰ Moreover, beginning from 1893 the Russian government began to encourage the cotton monoculture in the region by lowering the freight rate on grain

⁷⁸ Ian Murray Matley, "Agricultural Development," in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 274; Igor Lipovsky, "The Central Asian cotton epic," in *Central Asian Survey*, Volume 14, No. 4 (1995): 529.

⁷⁹ Edward Allworth, "Encounter," in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 28, Table 1.1.

⁸⁰ Ian Murray Matley, "Agricultural Development," 266-73.

shipped to Turkistan.⁸¹ Russian efforts for self-reliance on the supplies of cotton soon gave positive results in cotton production, but created disastrous effects on grain production as well as on the Uzbek peasants of the cotton lands. The Fergana Valley, for example, became one of the major cotton suppliers to Russia,⁸² but also a main grain-deficit area of Turkistan Government-General.⁸³

Immigration of Russians to Central Asia was another factor that caused disruptive impacts on nomads, besides the indigenous farmers. In 1896, the Resettlement Administration of Russia was established to promote colonization and Russian squatters were given protection against the claims of native farmers and nomads. Furthermore, after the peasant uprisings of 1905 to 1907 in European parts of the Russian Empire, the land available for the settlement of Russians was enlarged by 70 percent by lowering the norms defining the land needs of the nomads.⁸⁴

Yearly famines among the indigenous peoples of Central Asia between 1910 and 1913 were the result of grain-deficit and the expropriation of lands from the nomads.⁸⁵ Another result of Russian existence and policies in Central Asia was the continuous uprisings of indigenous peoples. As aforementioned, the Khanate of Kokand had been abolished after the 1875 rebellion. However, rebellions throughout the region continued after the abolishment of the Kokand Khanate. The first revolt broke out in 1885 in Andijan, Osh, and Marghilan districts of the Fergana *oblasti*. The 1891 riot in Namangan, another district of Fergana, followed the 1885 rebellion. Then, in 1892, the Tashkent riot burst out. It was again in Andijan that another revolt erupted in 1898.⁸⁶ It began on May 17, 1898 in a village of Andijan and quickly spread to Andijan city and the other towns of Fergana Valley. On the next day, a crowd of 2000 attacked Russian Army barracks in Andijan and killed twenty-two and wounded twenty-four soldiers. After the suppression of revolt, there were 226 death sentences and 777 prison sentences.⁸⁷

The last revolt during the time of the Russian Empire began in Uzbek country at Khojand (northern region of modern-day Tajikistan) on July 4, 1916. Spreading to Jizzakh (of Uzbekistan) on July 13, it grew into a real uprising. Some local officials and Russians were killed, others were arrested,

⁸¹ Seymour Becker, "The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences," in Hafeez Malik, ed., Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1994) 29.

⁸² Ian Murray Matley, "Agricultural Development," 274-5.

⁸³ Seymour Becker, "The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences," 30.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 31-2.

⁸⁵ Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia, 16.

⁸⁶ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories," 163-9.

⁸⁷ James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty, 121.

and communication facilities were destroyed. Very soon other disorders in most of the cities in Turkistan Government-General followed these uprisings. First, in Margilan, Namangan and Andijan in the Fergana Valley, then on the Kyrgyz and Kazak plains, conflicts between Central Asians and Russians began. Russian immigrants took advantage of Russian officials' support to confiscate the possessions of Central Asians. Additionally, immigrants formed armed groups which massacred the local population. The Central Asians also responded in the same manner. Consequently, the region remained an arena of bloody fighting until the end of August 1916.⁸⁸

There were other rebellions against the Emir of Bukhara in 1910 and 1913, and against the Khan of Khiva in 1874, 1875, 1877, 1915 and 1916 which required armed interventions of Turkistan Government-General on behalf of the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva.⁸⁹ According to Professor Helene Carrere d'Encausse,⁹⁰

All [Central Asian] revolts followed the same pattern . . . and their troops were formed of farmers and artisans from the towns, whose living conditions had worsened considerably . . . Russian industrial competition, the chaos existing in the agrarian relations, the dispossession of the peasants, and finally the excesses of the administration and the whole of the Russian population contributed greatly to the unrest.

These famines, massacres, and conflicts were still the causes of anti-Russian feeling in Uzbekistan at the end of 1980s. An example of this is Gulchehra Nurullaeva, a well-known Uzbek poetess who said in 1989 that these "atrocities" were historical reasons for enmity of Uzbeks toward Russians.⁹¹

3. The "National Delimitation"

Just after the uprising and suppression of 1916 in Central Asia, the February Revolution occurred in St. Petersburg. From February 1917 to February 1918, Muslim Central Asians did not oppose or support either the Provisional Government of St. Petersburg or the Bolsheviks. During the Provisional Government's reign, Central Asian Muslims held two congresses. The first one was

⁸⁸ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Fall of the Czarist Empire," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Role (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 210-1.

⁸⁹ Seymour Becker, "The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences," 26.

⁹⁰ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories," 163.

⁹¹ James Crichtlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan, 114-5.

convened in April 1917 by 450 delegates, including 93 Russians, and voted for resolutions demanding the cessation of Russian rule in Central Asia and the return of confiscated lands to the local population. They also concluded that their destiny should not be unilaterally determined by Russia. In the second congress in September 1917, Central Asians demanded the creation of an autonomous republic of Turkistan which would be federated with Russia. They also declared their opposition to intensive cotton cultivation because of severe grain shortages and famines, which were direct or indirect results of cotton farming.⁹²

In the next two months, the Bolsheviks began to take power in the Russian Empire. In November 1917, the third regional congress of soviets and the third regional Muslim congress were held in Tashkent. While the congress of soviets proclaimed the authority of the Soviets over all Turkistan, the third Muslim congress suggested the formation of a coalition government with soviets of Tashkent and local autonomy for Turkistan. Because Central Asian Muslims' proposals were not accepted by the Bolsheviks, the fourth congress of Muslims in Kokand on November 25, 1917, elected a council of 36 Muslims and 18 Russians and proclaimed the autonomy of southern Central Asia.⁹³

Their declaration of autonomy was not acceptable for the new Bolshevik government of Russia. In February 1918, the Bolshevik troops from Orenburg entered the city Kokand and sacked it.⁹⁴ "Even by writers sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause, admit that there were senseless looting and slaughter that reached monstrous proportions."⁹⁵ The total number of massacred Kokandians was between 10,000 and 50,000 out of 120,000 total population.⁹⁶

In the next thirty months after Kokandians' short lived autonomy, the Bolsheviks expanded their rule all over Central Asia. They captured Khiva in February 1919 and Bukhara in September 1920. Simultaneously, local communists, who were nationalists until 1918, proclaimed the Khorazm (Khiva) People's Republic and the Bukhara People's Republic.⁹⁷ Thus, toward the end of 1920, there were three communist states in Central Asia: Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of the USSR, and "independent" Khorazm and Bukhara People's Republics (Figure 2.4).

⁹² Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "The Fall of the Czarist Empire," 220.

⁹³ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 225-6.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 228.

⁹⁵ James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty, 125.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 125 and Steven Sabol, "The creation of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 national delimitation," Central Asian Survey Volume 14, No. 2 (1995): 230.

⁹⁷ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Civil War and New Governments," 242-5.



Figure 2.4 Central Asian Socialist Republics⁹⁸

In June 1923, Stalin decided that the Soviets wanted to “transform Turkistan into a model republic, into an advanced post for revolutionizing the East.”⁹⁹ However, according to the officials of the USSR and the independent republics, the Central Asian states’ economic structures and human resources, which were devastated by continuous uprisings, famines, and the Civil War, were not suitable to make them impressive examples of socialist development theories. For example, Turkistan SSR’s indigenous human resources declined approximately twenty-five percent between 1917-1920.¹⁰⁰

Perhaps, Central Asian nationalist intellectuals transformed themselves into communist leaders of Turkistan (Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand) during the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War because of this decline in human resources of Turkistan. Faizullah Khojaoglu, Abdur Rauf Fitrat, Munawwar Qari, Abdulla Qadiri, Cholpan, and Tawallo were those nationalist intellectuals who defined themselves as communists beginning from 1918. Faizullah Khojaoglu, for example, was the leader of nationalist Young Bukharans until 1920, the President of Bukhara People’s Republic between 1920 and 1924, and the Chairman of Uzbek SSR’s Council of People’s Commissars (Prime Minister) from 1925 to 1937. Abdur Rauf Fitrat, another nationalist Young Bukharan, was commissar (minister) of education of

⁹⁸ Donald S. Carlisle, “Geopolitics of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i, ed., *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies* (London: FRANK CASS, 1995) 94, Map 5.1.

⁹⁹ Steven Sabol, “The creation of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 national delimitation,” 236.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 236-7.

Bukhara People's Republic until the spring of 1923. They all wanted to create one national and independent state in Central Asia.¹⁰¹ However, they accepted the terms of the Bolsheviks in the end. As it was observed by Thomas Hobbes, "The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement."¹⁰² Tawallo's explanation for their agreement with the Bolsheviks was very close to Hobbes's observation. When he was asked why he had ceased his nationalist activities after 1918, he gave the following answer: The Bolsheviks would have killed an unlimited number of people if Central Asians had continued to pursue their nationalist ambitions. After 30 or 40 years of such vast killing, he added, the Uzbeks and other Central Asian people would have disappeared or been transformed into slaves. Because of this reason, he concluded, he gave way to communism and advised Cholpan to do the same thing.¹⁰³

The leaders of the USSR and the three socialist Central Asian republics found a solution within Marxist thought to insufficient economic and human resources of Central Asian states. Like Marx and Lenin, Stalin and the other leaders had believed that national consciousness would inevitably be replaced by the international proletariat solidarity which would also erase national loyalties, hatreds and tensions between ethnic groups.¹⁰⁴ Working with this theory, the communist leaders of aforementioned states concluded that transfers of resources, including peoples, from the richer to the poorer republics would solve their problems and create magnificent examples of socialism in Central Asia. According to the official terminology of the USSR, it was the policy of "the gradual equalization of levels of development of the national republics" which was also a stated objective of five-years plans even until 1972.¹⁰⁵

For the realization of Stalin's dreams, first, in 1923, the indigenous Communist parties abolished the Khorezm and the Bukhara People's Republics and replaced them with the Khorezm and Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republics. Second, the Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khorezm Communist Parties passed resolutions demanding "national delimitation" based on economic and linguistic characteristics

¹⁰¹ Seymour Becker, "National Consciousness and the Politics of the Bukhara People's Conciliar Republic," in Edward Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973) 159-167; Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990) 157, 183, 194, 198, 202, 226, 228, 295, 301.

¹⁰² Thomas Hobbes, "Relations Among Sovereigns," in P. Williams, D. M. Goldstein, J. M. Shafritz, eds., *Classic Readings of International Relations* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994) 30.

¹⁰³ Abdujabbar A. Abduvakhitov, "The Jadid Movement and Its Impact on Contemporary Central Asia," in Hafeez Malik, ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 71.

¹⁰⁴ Steven Sabol, "The creation of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 national delimitation," 226-7.

¹⁰⁵ Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Nationalities and the Soviet Economy," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990) 43.

of Central Asia which had been approved by the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on April 13, 1924.¹⁰⁶ In May 1924, the Central Asian Bureau established the Commission on National Delimitation to figure out the creation of new administrative units in Central Asia. Then, the Turkistan, Bukhara, and Khorezm SSRs dissolved themselves in September and October 1924. Finally, on October 27, 1924, when the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the delimitation proposal of the Commission on National Delimitation, six new administrative units came into existence. They were Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, Tajik and Kazak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), and Kara-Kyrgyz and Karakalpak Autonomous Oblasts (AO). Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs were constituent part of the USSR. Tajik ASSR was under jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR. Kara-Kyrgyz and Karakalpak AOs were linked to Kazak ASSR, which was federated with the Russian SFSR.¹⁰⁷

In the following years the “equalization of the national republics” continued. The Karakalpak AO was linked to the Russian SFSR in 1930, raised to ASSR status in 1932, and transferred to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR in 1936. At the same year, the Kara-Kyrgyz AO, which was elevated to ASSR in 1926, became the Kyrgyz SSR. The Tajik ASSR was detached from the Uzbek SSR and raised to the status of the Tajik SSR in 1929. The regions of the republics were also continuously transferred between Central Asian SSRs in order to equalize their resources. For example, Osh, Jelalabad, and Uzgen, which were populated mainly by Uzbeks were handed over to the Kyrgyz AO.¹⁰⁸ Another Uzbek region, the Khojand, the northern portion of modern-day Tajikistan, was transferred to the Tajik SSR in 1929.¹⁰⁹

According to official figures, 24 percent of Tajiks, 16 percent of Uzbeks, 12 percent of Kyrgyzes, and 7 percent of Turkmens remained outside their own socialist republics at the end of the national delimitation. Long before the national delimitation, the four Anglo-Russian agreements

¹⁰⁶ Steven Sabol, “The creation of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 national delimitation,” 234-5.

¹⁰⁷ Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “The Republics Lose Independence,” in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Role (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) 256-7.

¹⁰⁸ Igor P. Lipovsky, “Central Asia: In Search of a New Political Identity,” Middle East Journal, Volume 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996): 218.

¹⁰⁹ Donald S. Carlisle, “Geopolitics of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i, ed., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (Portland: FRANK CASS, 1995) 84.

concluded between 1870 and 1890 had also divided Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks so that half of the Tajiks, 10 percent of the Uzbeks, and 9 percent of the Turkmens had become the subjects of the Afghan Khans.¹¹⁰

Besides the “equalization” of Central Asian socialist republics, according to Professor Allworth, there was one more reason for the national delimitation. It was Russians’ perception that, the Uzbeks’ dynastic legacy (legacies of Genghis Khan and Amir Timur) and cultural power constituted a three-way threat to Russia. In Allworth’s words,¹¹¹

- (1) They [Uzbeks] stretched across much of settled Central Asia in sufficient numbers to participate in the culture and society of the entire southern territory;
- (2) If they continued to engage in politics of the areas they inhabited, the Uzbeks would carry a strong potential for influence in local affairs;
- (3) More than any other part of the Central Asian population, the Uzbeks exerted a pull of assimilation on others that expanded the Uzbek population and enhanced their reach in nearly every field.

Because of this perception, Allworth suggests, “segregating the Uzbeks became the cornerstone of the Soviet drive to divide Central Asians into six administrative units instead of the three that previously existed.”¹¹² In fact, the Uzbeks constituted over forty-one percent of the population of Turkistan SSR, seventy-nine percent of the population of the Khorazm PR, and about fifty percent of the population of Bukhara PR before “national delimitation.”¹¹³ However, their segregation with “artificial boundaries”¹¹⁴ has not been able to cut their ties with each other. Professor Gleason gives the following example for their ties and the concept of loyalty: “In some northern portions of Tojikistan, many people referred to Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, . . . , as Islam-aka (Father Islam).”¹¹⁵ A general observation about Uzbeks’ feelings comes from Professor Rywkin,¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Igor P. Lipovsky, “Central Asia: In Search of a New Political Identity,” *Middle East Journal*, Volume 50, No.2 (Spring 1996): 217-20.

¹¹¹ Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present*, 196.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 197.

¹¹³ Steven Sabol, “The creation of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 national delimitation,” 234.

¹¹⁴ Gregory Gleason, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) 10.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹¹⁶ Quoted by Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia*, 165.

An Uzbek may feel Uzbek, Muslim . . . or just part of his extended family, depending on the situation, the identity of the interlocutor, or just the mood of the moment. Facing a Kazakh he feels Uzbek, facing a Tatar he feels Turkistani, while confronting a Christian or a Jew he feels Muslim. A Russian makes him feel all three (Uzbek, Turkistani, Muslim) and awakens the latent resentment of a native against a settler.

C. CASE STUDIES

1. The Fergana-1989 Conflict

On June 3, 1989, an ethnic fighting between Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks erupted in the Fergana Valley. It lasted more than two weeks and was marked by heavy casualties and destruction. In Sergei A. Panarin's pungent words, it "had all the features of spontaneous ethnic aggression when the mob is the main actor."¹¹⁷

According to eyewitnesses, the first violence began on May 23 after a dispute about the price of strawberries in the marketplace in Kubasai, a neighborhood in the city of Fergana. Because he thought that her prices were too high, a Meshki Turk spoke rudely to a Uzbeki woman fruit vendor and poured a basket of her strawberries on her head. A fight immediately broke out between Uzbeks and Meshketians in the market place. However, peace was restored without delay.¹¹⁸

Ten days after the marketplace incident, on Saturday, June 3, the fighting was resumed by thousands of Uzbeks in and around the city of Fergana. Their targets were the Meshketian Turks. In two days, 43 Meshketians and 13 people from the other ethnic groups, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Russians, were killed and at least 500 were injured. The latter included at least dozens of Interior Ministry troops which were sent from Tashkent to Fergana to restore order. Damage to property was also substantial: more than 400 houses and some 116 cars and buses had been burnt.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, some 5,000 Meshketians were transported, first, to the refugee camps outside Fergana, and then to Namangan.¹²⁰ On June 7, President of the USSR, Gorbachev, reported that 9,000 soldiers with helicopters and armored personnel carriers were unable to halt the violence.¹²¹ On June 8, the violence spread to the town of Kokand in the Fergana

¹¹⁷ Sergei A. Panarin, "Political Dynamics of the 'New East' (1985-1993)," in Vitaly V. Naumkin, ed., Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994) 96.

¹¹⁸ Francis X. Clines, "57 Reported Dead in Uzbek Violence," The New York Times, June 7, 1989; John-Thor Dahlburg, "Arson Attacks, Killings Continue in Central Asia, Gorbachev Says," The Associated Press, June 7, 1989.

¹¹⁹ Peter Conradi, "Dozens Reported Dead in Soviet Uzbekistan Ethnic Riots," Reuters, June 5, 1989.

¹²⁰ Peter Conradi, "More than 50 Dead, 500 Hurt in Clashes in Soviet Uzbekistan," Reuters, June 6, 1989.

¹²¹ John-Thor Dahlburg, "Arson Attacks, Killings Continue in Central Asia, Gorbachev Says," The Associated Press, June 7, 1989.

Valley. A crowd of several thousand attacked the town militia station, in an attempt to seize firearms. Another crowd of 500-600 Uzbeks assaulted a Ministry of Internal Affairs transport department to seize the buses in order to go to Fergana to help their Uzbek brethren.

The results of these assaults included six dead and ninety wounded people. Among the wounded were twenty-one Internal Troops servicemen and six militia workers. The targets of the rioters included economic infrastructure too.¹²² By June 17, the number of the Interior Ministry troops stationed in Fergana reached to 12,000. They came from other regions of the USSR, such as the Baltic area, Moscow and the Ukraine. Additionally, on June 17, authorities in Tashkent began to send troops into Namangan and Andijan in order to protect non-Uzbeks.¹²³ According to Colonel General Shatalin, head of the main directorate of internal security forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by June 16, the number of dead stood at 94. As a result of pogroms and fires, 1,052 houses and other buildings of state institutions were burned down. A total of 984 people received physical injuries, including 137 servicemen of the internal security forces and 54 militia staff. Throughout the summer of 1989, the situation in the Fergana Valley, especially in Fergana, Kokand, Tashlak, Margilan, and in other population centers, remained tense.¹²⁴ According to the province newspaper *Ferganskaya Pravda*, at the end of July, "Every now and then the abandoned home of a Meshketian Turk will go up in flames or a shot will ring out in the direction of the night patrol."¹²⁵ Even in the middle of October 1989, the situation in Fergana remained difficult.¹²⁶

The victims in this case were Meshketian Turks who had been deported from southern Georgia during and after WW II. They were forcibly resettled to Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The total number resettled in Uzbekistan was 42,618. From 1944 to 1956, they were even forbidden to change their residence in these Central Asian republics. At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1956, their discriminatory status was partly lifted. Nevertheless, their desire to return to southern Georgia was not accepted by the Communist Party. Thereafter, their whole political activities

¹²² "The 'Pogroms' in Uzbekistan," *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 12, 1989; "Congress's Appeal on and Further Detail of Fergana Situation," *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 9, 1989.

¹²³ Peter Conradi, "Troops Sent to Other Regions of Uzbekistan's Fergana Valley," *Reuters*, June 17, 1989.

¹²⁴ "Situation in Fergana 'Returning to Normal,'" *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 22, 1989.

¹²⁵ M. Lurye, "A month of waiting and anxiety," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XLI, No. 27 (1989):23.

¹²⁶ V. Artemenko and A. Kaipbergenov, "Have any lessons been learned from the events in Fergana Province?" *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XLI, No. 41 (1989): 24.

were aimed at the realization of this goal. During 1962-1989, they send more than 200 delegations to the authorities in Moscow and Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to obtain permission for their return to southern Georgia.¹²⁷

In the beginning the Uzbeks were rather sympathetic with Meshketian Turks' situation since both of the ethnic groups were related to each other religiously and linguistically.¹²⁸ However, in the course of time the Meshketian Turks' settlements became closed communities, in which they maintain contacts with each other but reduced to a minimum contacts with the Uzbeks. Meanwhile, their population reached to 100,000 in Uzbekistan and they became more prosperous than their Uzbek neighbors. Moreover, they began to consider themselves as separate and superior than the Uzbeks. As Professor Khazanov put it,¹²⁹

. . . the feeling of separateness, which was operating on the lines of a 'we-they' opposition typical of all kinds of ethnic differentiation, was further intensified amongst Meshketian Turks by the development of a kind of superiority complex. Considering themselves most advanced, they tended to look down upon the indigenous populations of Central Asia, . . .

The reasons of the conflict, besides the strawberries affair, was declared at least eighteen months before the conflict. According to R. A. Akhmedov, deputy head of the labor department of Fergana Oblast Executive Committee, there was not enough work in the oblast for all those wanting it. Those who could not find a job were primarily young people and their number was increasing every year by 7,000. Moreover, Akhmedov argued in December 1987 that the people of Fergana lost their hope for the future. He said, "What can the people of Fergana expect tomorrow? It is no secret that there are rumors going around about future unemployment."¹³⁰ In June 1989, the crowds of Uzbeks consisted of Uzbek youths aged from 16 to 20, drunk or on drugs.¹³¹ During and after the conflict, Russian and Uzbek authorities insistently said that there were 70,000 able-bodied people who were unemployed for three or four years in the Fergana Oblast. In these authorities' view, the conflict was the result of widespread unemployment

¹²⁷ Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) 199.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 201.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 202-3.

¹³⁰ V. Berezovskiy, "Not enough work for Uzbeks in Fergana Oblast," BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, January 30, 1988.

¹³¹ John-Thor Dahlburg, "Arson Attacks, Killings Continue in Central Asia, Gorbachev Says," The Associated Press, June 7, 1989.

among the Uzbek youth.¹³² Later, their opinions were also supported by some prominent scholars, Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser. They wrote, “The Uzbek riots against Meshketian Turks in 1989 were led by young unemployed indigenes who viewed outsiders as receiving preferential treatment in jobs, wages, and access to housing.”¹³³ Sergei Panarin added, “Much has been written about certain mysterious ‘antireformation forces’, allegedly to blame for the Fergana slaughter. Judging by the general nature of the mass disturbances, a conspiracy seems unlikely . . . there was an atmosphere of general frustration among the unemployed Uzbek youth.”¹³⁴

Recently, one more article about the Fergana-1989 conflict was published.¹³⁵ From this article, we can learn the perceptions of Uzbeks. How did they perceive the Meshketian Turks in 1989? One Uzbek said as quoted by the author, “The Meshketian Turks were given the best land when they settled in Central Asia and they had a lot of money. . . . They took our land. They are greedy and steal our water.” Also, there are two other accounts in this article that tells us the symbols that were used by conflicting parties. According to one Armenian, “There were fanatics with banners and signs reading Islamic slogans.” To an Uzbek, “some unknown person was going around showing pictures of an Uzbek girl who had been raped and beaten and was demanding revenge.” ‘Islamic banners’ was also mentioned by one Russian journalist and eyewitness of events in 1989.¹³⁶

2. The Osh-1990 Conflict

One year after the 1989 conflict, on June 4, 1990, one more conflict burst out in the Fergana Valley. It was between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan, a few miles from famous Fergana and Andijan, on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It continued throughout the summer of 1990. At the end, there were 230 dead of whom 132 were Uzbeks, 400 missing, and more than 2,000

¹³² V. Artemenko and A. Kaipbergenov, “Have any lessons been learned from the events in Fergana Province?” *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XLI, No. 41 (1989): 24; “The riots in Fergana,” *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 7, 1989.

¹³³ Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 229.

¹³⁴ Sergei A. Panarin, “Political Dynamics of the ‘New East’ (1985-1993),” 96.

¹³⁵ David M. Abramson, “Remembering the Present: The Meaning Today of the 1989 Violence in Kokand,” *Central Asia Monitor*, No.3 (1997): 18-21.

¹³⁶ Igor Petrovich Belyayev, “Resonance,” *Official Kremlin Int’l News Broadcast*, July 11, 1989.

injured people from both sides. Some 500 buildings and 100 cars were burnt and part of the harvest was ruined.¹³⁷ The state of emergency which was introduced during the conflict in 1990 was lifted in September 1995.¹³⁸

Before the conflict sixty percent of the population of Osh was Kyrgyz and twenty-five percent Uzbek.¹³⁹ However, the best land and factories were being controlled by the well-to-do Uzbeks. On the other hand, unemployment was around sixteen percent in Kyrgyzstan in 1990 and there had been demonstrations for housing since February 1990.¹⁴⁰ Also, as of June 1990, more than 12,000 residents of the city Osh were registered on the official waiting lists for housing¹⁴¹ and approximately 40,000 people were jobless in the Osh region.¹⁴²

In June 1990, the reason for conflict was a dispute over 79 acres of farm land which belonged to a collective farm of Uzbeks. When local authorities allowed the homeless Kyrgyz people of Osh to build homes on this farmland, Uzbeks demanded that their farmland be returned. In the morning of June 4, Kyrgyz young people began to occupy 79 acres of farm land. While Kyrgyzes were occupying and partitioning the land, Uzbeks began to gather on the opposite side of the land. At the same time, special-purpose police detachments arrived on the scene and were stationed between them. By 5:30 P.M., Uzbeks numbered 10,000. Police forces, first, made an attempt to drive them off the field. Uzbeks responded with throwing stone and empty bottles. At 7:14 P.M., police fired warning shots into the air. Uzbeks again responded with stones, sticks, and other objects that came to hand. Thereafter, police lost control over the crowds and fighting between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes began.¹⁴³ According to a correspondent of the Soviet army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, "crowds of young thugs were moving along the streets and fighting with other thugs."¹⁴⁴ At 10 P.M. a state of emergency was declared. However, the fighting continued all night.

¹³⁷ Boris Mainayev, "Party committee plenum focuses on ethnic conflict in Osh," *ITAR-TASS*, August 13, 1990.

¹³⁸ "Kyrgyz chamber considers Osh emergency already lifted," *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, October 7, 1995.

¹³⁹ James Rosen, "Death toll rises in Kirghizia," *United Press International*, July 19, 1990.

¹⁴⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?* 145-6.

¹⁴¹ "Kirgizia hit by ethnic battles with Uzbeks," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XLII, No. 23 (1990): 1.

¹⁴² Boris Mainayev, "Government to increase aid to Kirghizia," *BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 25, 1990.

¹⁴³ "Kirgizia hit by ethnic battles with Uzbeks," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Volume XLII, No. 23 (1990): 1.

¹⁴⁴ Brian Friedman, "More deaths reported in Kirghizia," *The Associated Press*, June 6, 1990.

The next day, they began to attack regional civil defense headquarters and police stations in order to get additional guns while the conflict was spreading to neighboring cities. At the same time, several thousand Kyrgyzes in Frunze (currently Bishkek), the capital of Kyrgyzstan, were demanding to be transported to Osh to participate in the conflict. A crowd of many thousand Uzbeks ready to go to help their brethren in Kyrgyzstan stood at the border between Andijan and Osh.¹⁴⁵ According to Vadim Bakatin, Interior Minister of the USSR, because of the Uzbeks of Andijan “the local clashes may turn into a conflict between two republics.” To prevent a probable confrontation between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, they sent 900 Interior Ministry troops, 1,500 regular army soldiers and 450 border guards to keep the Uzbeks of Andijan in Uzbekistan.¹⁴⁶

On June 6 and 7, in addition to ethnical conflicts, conflicting parties began to attack officials and state properties. For example, on June 7, an excited crowd armed with sticks, hoes and pitchforks attacked a district Party committee building, the hospital and the district Internal Affairs department.¹⁴⁷ The next month, ethnic conflict began to turn a resistance movement against the government of Kyrgyzstan. On July 17, the targets of young Uzbeks were the hostels of two plants and the Osh Pedagogical Institute, a militia post, and a fire-fighting station. Moreover, Uzbek residents of Uzgen, a town 35 miles outside Osh, demanded the arrival of a UN commission to Uzgen and a construction of a road between Uzgen and Uzbekistan.¹⁴⁸ They also began to built barricades on the roads into Uzgen from Kyrgyzstan to prevent Kyrgyzes from entering the town.¹⁴⁹

From the morning of July 22, groups of Russian-speaking people of Osh started to gather on the central square of the town. Also, Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, the Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, and General Shatalin who was the Commander of USSR Internal Troops arrived at the square to meet the Russian-speaking population. Those gathered demanded “more resolute measures for establishing order and for returning to normal as quickly as possible.” Officials also noted with concern that the instability and lack of guarantees of citizens’ safety was generating a desire to migrate among the Russian-speaking population.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ “Soviet Interior Minister says Kirghizia violence spreading,” Reuters, June 7, 1990.

¹⁴⁶ Gerald Nadler, “Senior official : Ethnic strife may lead to ‘conflict’ between republics,” United Press International, June 7, 1990.

¹⁴⁷ “Kirgizia Hit by Ethnic Battles with Uzbeks,” The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XLII, No. 23 (1990): 1.

¹⁴⁸ Boris Mainayev, “Fresh clashes in Osh region, situation worsens,” ITAR-TASS, July 17, 1990.

¹⁴⁹ James Rosen, “Death toll rises in Kirghizia,” United Press International, July 20, 1990.

¹⁵⁰ Boris Mainayev, “Government to increase aid to Kirghizia,” BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, July 25, 1990.

D. CONCLUSION

First, Uzbekistan, along with the other Central Asian states, is experiencing an environmental disaster because of excessive irrigation. For this reason, Uzbekistan's agriculture based on irrigation can no longer be sustained.

Second, as a result of historical events, Uzbeks believe that Uzbekistan has been their country since 6th century. Therefore, they claim that the legitimate ethnic group of Uzbekistan is the Uzbeks and only the Uzbeks deserve preferential treatment. On the other hand, as it was put by Prince Gorchakov and later revealed by Dukhovskii, immigrants claim that they modernized Uzbekistan and its "half-savage nomads." Furthermore, because of their seven-hundred-year-long common histories, there is a strong enmity between them. The Uzbeks perceive Russians as the executioners¹⁵¹ of massacred Kokandians and the others in the years between 1865 and 1918. The Russians perceive the Uzbeks in two different way: inferior than Russians because the Uzbeks were nomads when modernized Russians came to Uzbekistan; superior than Russians because the Uzbeks are the inheritors of Uzbeg Khan and Amir Timur, who once ruled as far as to Moscow.

Third, the Uzbeks of Central Asia preserve their ties with each other and perceive themselves not only as a citizen of Tajikistan or other states, but also as an Uzbek, Muslim and Turkistani when they face a Russian.

Fourth, the case of Fergana-1989 conflict shows that it began spontaneously as a result of unemployed Uzbek youths' attack on "wealthy and greedy" Meshketian Turks. For Uzbek youth, the cause of their unemployment was the existence of Meshketian Turks in Uzbekistan even though Meshketians had been ready to leave Uzbekistan since 1956. What made the Uzbek youth hostile to Meshketians was the perception of a superiority complex, prosperity, and separate community living of the Meshketians. Furthermore, this conflict demonstrates that when ethnic groups begin to fight each other, they invent or revive additional symbols in order to intensify the conflict. As it is revealed by Armenian, Russian, and Uzbek eyewitnesses, "religious flags and figures" and "photographs of victims" had been carried. However, they were not carried before the initiation of conflict, but after.

¹⁵¹ Uzbek poetess Gulchehra Nurullaeva uses the word "cellatliklar" for the past Russian policies toward Uzbeks. James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan*, 114-5. The word "cellat" in Uzbek properly means executioner or butcher.

Fifth, the case of Osh-1990 conflict presents that it was completely a result of competition between homeless Kyrgyzes and farming Uzbeks for 79 acres of land. Like Fergana-1989, it was again carried out unemployed young Uzbeks and Kyrgyzes.

Finally, both cases and historical evidence show that conflicts of Uzbeks are prone to spread all over Central Asia and to change very quickly from purely ethnic conflict to a confrontation between Uzbeks and the rest, including law enforcement forces.

THE
JOURNAL
OF
THE
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
VOLUME 38
PART 1
1908
LONDON
PUBLISHED BY THE
Royal Society of Medicine
11, BEDFORD SQUARE, W.C.1
1908

III. CURRENT ETHNIC, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL ISSUES

First, this chapter examines the current ethnic structure of Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian States in regard to their Uzbek minorities. Second, it analyzes out-migration of Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in order to predict the future ethnic structure of Uzbekistan. Relations of ethnic groups and human rights policy of Uzbekistan are the fourth and fifth subjects of this chapter. Finally, it analyzes the population growth of Uzbekistan and its likely effect on ethnic relations.

A. ETHNIC STRUCTURE

The four Russian-British agreements on Afghanistan, the national delimitation of the 1920s, and more than one-hundred years of Russian rule created six polyethnic states in Central Asia (Table 3.1). Uzbek minorities in these states live in closed communities in certain areas without intermingling with the other ethnic groups. They also generally reside in provinces bordering Uzbekistan. These provinces are the Khojand of Tajikistan with 1.5 million Uzbeks, Chimkent of Kazakstan with 0.28 million Uzbeks, Osh of Kyrgyzstan with 0.5 million Uzbeks, and six provinces in northern Afghanistan with approximately 1.5 million Uzbeks.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Anthony Hyman, Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict on Terrorism, 1994) 10; Robert J. Kaiser, "Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 1992) 290; Lee Schwartz, "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 1992) 48; Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994) 80.

Table 3.1 Ethnic Structure of Central Asian States ¹⁵³

	<u>Uzbekistan</u>	<u>Kyrgyzstan</u>	<u>Tajikistan</u>	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>Turkmenistan</u>	<u>Kazakstan</u>	<u>Total</u>
Population	22,200,000	4,700,000	6,000,000	22,600,000	4,500,000	16,000,000	76,000,000
Uzbek	74.5%	12.9%	25%	6%	9%	2%	20,726,300
Tajik	4.8%	0.7%	64.9%	25%	-	-	10,642,500
Kazak	4.1%	0.8%	-	-	2%	51%	9,197,800
Russian	6.5%	21.5%	3.5%	-	9.8%	32%	8,224,500
Turkmen	0.7%	-	-	6%	73.3%	N/A	4,809,900
Kyrgyz	0.8%	52.4%	1.3%	-	-	N/A	2,718,400
Ukrainian	0.8%	2.5%	N/A	-	N/A	5.2%	1,127,100
Tatar	2.4%	1.6%	1.4%	-	-	N/A	692,000
Karakalpak	2.1%	-	-	-	-	-	466,200
German	0.2%	2.4%	-	-	-	1.9%	461,200
Pashtun	-	-	-	38%	-	-	8,588,000
Hazara	-	-	-	19%	-	-	4,294,000
Others	3.1%	5.2%	3.9%	6%	5.9%	7.9%	4,052,100

Note: N/A: Exact numbers of ethnic groups are not available.

Like the Uzbek minority of other Central Asian states, the Russian-speaking population of Uzbekistan resides separately in certain provinces of Uzbekistan. As it is shown in Table 3.2, most of them live in Tashkent city, and in Tashkent and Syrdarya provinces. Environmentally hazardous Khorazm and Karakalpakistan, and ethnically dangerous Andijan and Namangan host fewer Russian-speaking minorities than the other provinces.

¹⁵³ Charles Undeland and Nicholas Platt, The Central Asian Republics (New York: The Asia Society, 1994) 31, 45, 58, 78, 93; Bhavna Dave, "Opposition Finds a Voice in Kazakhstan," Transition, 7 February 1997, 88; Roger D. Kangas, "Holding the Course in Uzbekistan," Transition, 7 February 1997, 90; Rajan Menon, Central Asia's Foreign Policy and Security Challenges: Implications for the United States, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 1995) 9; Nancy Lubin, "Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends," in William Fierman, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 40; Cynthia Buckley, "Exodus? Out-Migration from the Central Asian Successor States to the Russian Federation," Central Asia Monitor, No.3 (1996):17; David Nissman, "Turkmenistan: Searching for a National Identity," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 395.

Table 3.2 Uzbek and Russian-Speaking Population in 1989¹⁵⁴

	Total	Uzbek	Russian	Tatar	Korean	Ukrainian
	(Thousands)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Tashkent City	2,060	44.2	34.0	6.3	2.1	2.9
Tashkent	2,143	50.2	14.6	5.0	3.6	1.3
Bukhara	1,622	75.6	8.2	1.5	0.2	0.8
Syrdarya	1,298	71.2	6.8	2.6	1.3	N/A
Fergana	2,142	81.0	5.8	1.5	N/A	0.5
Samarkand	2,282	77.3	5.0	1.5	0.4	0.6
Surkhandarya	1,250	79.4	3.0	1.4	N/A	N/A
Andijan	1,721	87.6	2.6	1.4	N/A	N/A
Namangan	1,471	85.1	1.8	1.0	N/A	N/A
Qashqadarya	1,596	87.7	2.4	1.3	N/A	N/A
Karakalpakistan	1,212	32.8	1.6	N/A	0.7	N/A
Khorazm	1,012	94.7	1.2	0.8	N/A	N/A
Total	19,810	71.4	8.3	2.4	0.9	0.8

Note: N/A: Zero, negligible, or data not available.

Secondly, the Russian-speaking population lives mainly in urban areas. For example, by the 1989 census, there were only about 100,000 rural Russians and Ukrainians.¹⁵⁵ However, as it is presented in Table 3.3, percentages of Uzbeks and Russians in urban areas have been changing in favor of Uzbeks since 1970. This trend was the result of out-migration of minorities and the high population growth rate of Uzbeks that will be analyzed in the following section.

¹⁵⁴ Uzbekistan: An Economic Profile (Springfield: National Technical Information Service, 1993) 28-9.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 43.

Table 3.3 Changes in the Percentage of Uzbeks and Russians in the Rural and Urban Population of Uzbekistan¹⁵⁶

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>	
	<u>Uzbek</u>	<u>Russian</u>	<u>Uzbek</u>	<u>Russian</u>
1970	41.1	30.4	79.5	2.2
1979	48.1	24.8	82.8	1.2
1989	53.7	19.5	83.5	0.7

B. OUT-MIGRATION

Out-migration of the Russian speaking population from Central Asian states began in 1976 due to the deterioration of economic conditions. At the beginning of 1970s, economic stagnation in the USSR forced Russian government to direct investments toward the European parts of the USSR and neglect the Central Asian states. This relative economic neglect of Central Asian states continued until the fall of the USSR and resulted in an out-migration of approximately 1 million people from Central Asian states between 1979 and 1988, with Russians accounting for 216,883.¹⁵⁷

Beginning in 1989, out-migration intensified and reached its turning point in 1994. In the years between 1989 and 1994, the number of Russian-speaking people emigrated from Uzbekistan totaled 585,600. Annual out-migration is presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Out-migration of Russian-speaking Population from Uzbekistan¹⁵⁸

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Out-migration	41,600	180,000	96,000	75,000	54,000	139,000

Out-migration began to decrease after 1994. According to one Russian analyst, one of the two reasons for decrease in out-migration was the unwillingness of young male Russians at or near draft age to relocate to the Russian Federation because of the war in Chechnya. The second reason was the decline in economic and social conditions of the Russian Federation.¹⁵⁹ According to a survey conducted during 1994-1995 in Uzbekistan, the most important conditions for relocation of the Russian speaking

¹⁵⁶ Sergei Nikolaev, "Russians in Uzbekistan," in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 110.

¹⁵⁷ Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, *Russians as the New Minority* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 222.

¹⁵⁸ Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaya, "Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union," in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) Table 2.1.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 24-5.

population were provisions for comfortable housing and a job with matching professional qualifications (Table 3.5). Only a small number of them were ready to immigrate to the Russian Federation under any circumstances.

Table 3.5 Most Important Conditions for Relocation¹⁶⁰
(percents of those willing to relocate)

Provision for comfortable housing	42.1
Provision for any housing	13.9
Provision of a job matching professional qualifications	30.5
Provision of any job	9.1
Removal of property	27.0
Preservation of social guarantees and benefits (pension, seniority, etc.)	25.4
Under any circumstances	9.1

The author of this survey was a senior researcher at the Institute of Economic Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences. In July 1996, the same author in an article about the immigrants addressed the lack of capacity of the Russian Federation with the following words,¹⁶¹

In the next five years, Russia can expect that 39% of Uzbekistan's non-eponymous population will move here to take up permanent residence. Among them, the percentage of Russians will be 75%. All of immigrants from Central Asia will be 4 million. This is not an extreme prediction, . . . but Russia can't even cope with that number.

The economic and social lack of capabilities of the Russian Federation was also declared by other articles. For example, according to observations of a correspondent of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in October 1996, immigrants from abroad in Yaroslavl were living in dormitories of factories; none of them had received a housing loan or financial assistance; not a single of them knew what rights or benefits he or she was entitled to; their families had gone hungry for months; and their children were suffering from tuberculosis and other diseases. She also informed her readers that,¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Galina S. Vitkovskaya, "Relocation to Russia From the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate," in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 119.

¹⁶¹ Galina Vitkovskaya, "We Can Expect a Flood of Refugees in the Next Five Years," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11 July 1996, *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* Vol. XLVIII, No.28 (1996):19-20.

¹⁶² Natalya Airapetova, "Yaroslavl Bureaucrats Successfully Battle Russian Citizens from the Near Abroad," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 October 1996, *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* Vol. XLVIII, No.44 (1996): 19-20.

In the next five years we can expect a flood of 5 million migrants, mainly from Central Asia. If Russia plans to continue keeping its citizens in ghettos, deceiving them about . . . the receipt of loans, we need to directly inform millions of people of this, not spread political illusions.

Information of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* is important because its editor-in-chief is a member of the supervisory council of the Institute of Problems of the Diaspora and Integration. As a result of circulation of this type of information about the social and economic conditions of the Russian Federation in 1996, out-migration from Uzbekistan decreased to an average of 130-150 people a day or 50,000 a year.¹⁶³ Consequently, considering the total number of Russian-speaking population which is estimated at 2,100,000 in 1997 and their average out-migration, it can be expected that a substantial number of them will continue to reside in Uzbekistan in the next five years and beyond.

C. ETHNIC RELATIONS

In the first two sections of this chapter, it is concluded that a substantial number of Russian-speaking people will continue to reside in certain areas, mostly in the cities of Uzbekistan. In this section their relations with Uzbeks will be analyzed.

First of all, both Uzbeks and minorities have to speak the same language in order to communicate and therefore to prevent misunderstandings. However, according to the figures of the 1989 census, only 23.8 percent of Uzbeks had a command of Russian as a second language and 4.6 percent of all ethnic Russians had a knowledge of Uzbek as a first or second language.¹⁶⁴ Also, the percentage of bilingual ethnic Russians living in Russian concentrations, such as the city of Tashkent and the Tashkent region, was lower than average. For example, only 24,741 out of 706,885 ethnic Russian resident of the city of Tashkent could speak and understand Uzbek in 1989.¹⁶⁵

The attitude of Russian-speaking population toward Uzbek language has not changed since 1989. In spite of adoption of Uzbek language as the official language in 1989, the Russian-speaking population did not show any willingness to learn Uzbek. Quite the contrary, they mobilized support of

¹⁶³ Roger Kangas, "Russian Emigration from Uzbekistan Continues," *OMRI Daily Digest*, 22 February 1996.

¹⁶⁴ Robert J. Kaiser, "Social Mobilization in Soviet Central Asia," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 262; Cynthia Buckley, "Exodus? Out-migration from the Central Asian Successor States to the Russian Federation," *Central Asia Monitor*, No.3 (1996): 16.

¹⁶⁵ Sergei Nikolaev, "Russians in Uzbekistan," in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 117.

political elites from Russia to put pressure on Uzbekistan to grant official status to Russian.¹⁶⁶ They also began to construct theories about territorial and cultural autonomy of Russian-speaking population because of their inadequate knowledge of Uzbek.¹⁶⁷ However, according to Sergei Panarin, “It is unlikely that in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan they [‘Europeans’ for S. Panarin] will be able to establish even cultural autonomy.”¹⁶⁸

Second, the Russian-speaking population traditionally tends to isolate themselves from Uzbeks. They do not feel that they are an integral part of the population of Uzbekistan.¹⁶⁹ They continue to consider themselves the “Big Brother” of the “half-savage and semi-nomad” Uzbeks. For this reason, they do not accept Uzbekistan as their homeland, and even only 50 percent of them who intend to stay in Uzbekistan perceive themselves as citizens of Uzbekistan.¹⁷⁰ In the words of S. Nikolaev,¹⁷¹

Russians living in Uzbekistan . . . assume an arrogant attitude toward the traditions, language, customs, and habits of Uzbeks and to ignore them altogether in their everyday life. . . . The sooner the Russians are able to recognize themselves as a minority, the sooner they will be able to adapt to their new position in the ethnic hierarchy of Uzbekistan and to the new geopolitical reality of an independent Republic of Uzbekistan, whose political and economic interests will be oriented not only to the north, to Russia, but to the world as a whole.

Third, as a result of former policies, an ethnic division of labor continues to divide Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population. In 1989, while Russians constituted 8.6 percent of the total population, they were only 0.8 percent of the workforce in the agricultural sector. At the same time, they constituted

¹⁶⁶ Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 234; Emil A. Payin and Andrei I. Susarov, “The Political Context of Migration in the Former Soviet Union,” in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 55.

¹⁶⁷ Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 234.

¹⁶⁸ Sergei A. Panarin, “Political Development Paradigms for the Newly Independent States in Central Asia: The Consequences of Migration,” in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 101.

¹⁶⁹ Vladimir Mukomel, “Demographic Problems of Russian Adaptation in the Republics,” in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 156; Vladimir Mesamed, “Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Uzbekistan,” Central Asia Monitor, No.6 (1996) 22.

¹⁷⁰ Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Relocation to Russia From the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate,” in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 131.

¹⁷¹ Sergei Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 115.

20 percent of industrial-sector workers, 23 percent of communications workers, 25 percent of administrative personnel, 28 percent of information/computing-sector workers and 38 percent of scientific personnel.¹⁷² As a consequence of their employment in urban environment, they are also able to enjoy the advantages of better education, social services and higher wages than the Uzbeks.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population are employed in different factories or working places. According to observations of V. Mesamed,¹⁷⁴

Uzbeks are on the whole employed at medium-size factories. On the other hand, at the huge plants situated in areas of Russophone concentration, nonindigenous nationalities attain 90% of the workforce. This suggests that everyday contact and communication between the natives and the Russian-speaking population is rather limited and reflects the situation in colonial or postcolonial societies.

D. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF UZBEKISTAN

In the “Preamble” of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “their adherence to human rights and principles of state sovereignty” is declared. In Article Four, it is expressed that “The state language of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be Uzbek. The Republic of Uzbekistan shall ensure a respectful attitude toward the languages, customs and traditions of all nationalities and ethnic groups living on its territory, and create the conditions necessary for their development.”¹⁷⁵ By the same token, the Law of the State Language of Uzbekistan guarantees the right to free choice of the language of school education.¹⁷⁶

The other important articles of Uzbekistan’s constitution regarding human rights and minorities are the followings:

Article 8. All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, regardless of their nationality, constitute the people of Uzbekistan;

Article 18. All citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall have equal rights and freedoms, and shall be equal before the law, without

¹⁷² Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 43.

¹⁷³ Sergei Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” in Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin, eds., The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994) 112.

¹⁷⁴ Vladimir Mesamed, “Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Uzbekistan,” Central Asia Monitor No.6 (1996) 22.

¹⁷⁵ Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 1992).

¹⁷⁶ Vladimir Mesamed, “Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Uzbekistan,” Central Asia Monitor, No.6 (1996): 24.

discrimination by sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, individual and social status;

Article 19. No one shall have the power to deny a citizen his rights and freedoms;

Article 31. Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any religion.

Naturally, implementation of these articles is more important than their inclusion in the constitution. In the words of President of Uzbekistan at the sixth session of Uzbekistan's supreme assembly (the Oliy Majlis), on August 29, 1996,¹⁷⁷

It is necessary to arrange the legislation of the Republic in conformity with the international standards of human rights protection. There are 70 internationally accepted standards in the sphere of human rights protection . . . Uzbekistan so far has joined only 15 of them. The Oliy Majlis needs to do a lot in this direction.

In 1996, Uzbek government also allowed some international human rights protection and monitoring institutions to open offices in Uzbekistan. In April, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and in June the Open Society Institute opened their Uzbekistan bureaus in Tashkent.¹⁷⁸

In the sphere of religious freedom, the situation of Orthodox Russian-speaking population in 1996 was very satisfactory for Patriarch Aleksei II of Moscow and all Russia. To the Patriarch, the celebration of the 125th anniversary of the Central Asian eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, the construction of the spiritual center of the eparchy in Tashkent, the restoration of St. Aleksei's Cathedral in Samarkand, and the opening of new churches in Bukhara, Qashqadarya, and Syrdarya "made it clear that Russian Orthodox Christianity is respected just as much as the Islam." He also stated that all these measures helped reduce migration of the Russian-speaking people from Uzbekistan.¹⁷⁹ According to a recent report of U.S. Department of State, not only Russian Orthodox, but also several other

¹⁷⁷ Islam Karimov, "Main Tasks of Deepening Democratic Reforms at the Present Stage," Tashkent, 29 August 1996 at [gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/partners/uzbekistan](http://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/partners/uzbekistan).

¹⁷⁸ Bhavna Dave, "Open Society Institute Opens Office in Uzbekistan," *OMRI Daily Digest*, 28 June 1996; U.S. Department of State, The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *Uzbekistan Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*, 30 January 1997.

¹⁷⁹ Olga Kostromina, "Russian Patriarch Pleased with Respect for Orthodoxy in Asia," *ITAR-TASS*, 20 November 1996; Bruce Pannier, "Russian Orthodox Patriarch in Uzbekistan," *OMRI Daily Digest*, 12 November 1996.

denominations operate freely in Uzbekistan. “However,” the report adds, “tensions arise when churches attempt to convert across ethnic lines, particularly the conversion of Muslims to Christianity.”¹⁸⁰

As a conclusion, first, in the Republic of Uzbekistan, legal guarantees for the development and preservation of basic human rights of all the ethnic groups living there has been improving. Second, as it was observed by U.S. Department of State and Patriarch Aleksei II, the Uzbek government does not follow a discriminatory policy toward the religions other than Islam. Finally, since the Law of the State Language also guarantees the right to free choice of the language of school education, any reason for conflict cannot be found in the human rights policy of Uzbekistan.

E. POPULATION GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES

In the case studies of Chapter II, it is argued that one of the major reasons for conflict in 1989 was the problem of unemployment of young Uzbeks because of high population growth. In this section, population growth of Uzbekistan and its effect on employment will be analyzed.

The population of Uzbekistan more than tripled between 1951 and 1989. Thus Uzbekistan, with 44.5 people per square km, became the most densely populated state of Central Asia (Table 3.6). Furthermore, the most densely populated rural areas of all the USSR were the rural settlements of Uzbekistan, such as the Fergana Valley, Jizzakh, Bukhara, and Samarkand. On an oblast basis, the degree of density was even greater. Three of the four most densely populated oblasts of Central Asia were all located in the Fergana Valley: Andijan, Fergana, and Namangan. Andijan was the most densely populated oblast in the USSR.¹⁸¹

Table 3.6 Population of Uzbekistan by Year¹⁸²

<u>Population in thousands</u>		<u>Average annual percentage change</u>	
1951	6,434		
1959	8,119	1951-9	2.9
1970	11,799	1959-70	3.4
1979	15,391	1970-9	2.9
1989	19,906	1979-89	2.5

¹⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Policies in Support of Religious Freedom: Focus on Christians, 22 July 1997.

¹⁸¹ Richard Rowland, “Demographic Trends in Soviet Central Asia and Southern Kazakhstan,” in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 230-2.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 233.

Because of the economic policy of the USSR after 1972 (which is mentioned in the second section of this chapter) the share of Central Asian states in total investment of the USSR remained very low. Moreover, the most densely populated regions, Andijan, Namangan, and Fergana, consistently attracted much less investment than the other regions of Uzbekistan (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Relative Per Capita Investments, 1971-85¹⁸³

	<u>1971-5</u>	<u>1976-80</u>	<u>1981-5</u>
USSR	100	100	100
Central Asian States	76	69	66
Uzbekistan	75	71	68
Jizzakh, Syrdarya	131	141	95
Tashkent	91	84	88
Karakalpakistan	95	93	96
Surkhandarya, Qashqadarya	90	89	77
Khorezm	67	66	62
Bukhara, Samarkand, Nawoiy	59	59	50
Andijan, Namangan, Fergana	50	45	46

One important result of this investment policy was the intensification of unemployment among the Uzbek youth.¹⁸⁴ And the likely outcome of high population growth and low investment policy was obvious for many observers of Uzbekistan even in the first half of 1980s. As Professor Nancy Lubin, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in 1984, five years before the Uzbek-Meshketian conflict,¹⁸⁵

. . . for the indigenous nationalities, a perceived worsening quality of life has already become linked with the presence of “outsiders” in their republic. The possibility of a more extreme economic slowdown in Uzbekistan . . . would hold immense ethnic implications which go beyond purely economic considerations alone. It could spark deep-seated nationalist hostilities and resentments which would be difficult to contain.

Uzbekistan’s population growth rate decreased from 2.5 percent per year in the 1980s to 1.87 percent in 1996.¹⁸⁶ According to current estimates which consider even further decline in the growth rate

¹⁸³ Ronald D. Liebowitz, “Soviet Geographical Imbalances and Soviet Central Asia,” in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (New York: Routledge, 1992) Tables 5.4 and 5.6.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 114-6.

¹⁸⁵ Quoted in Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) 136.

¹⁸⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/uz.html>.

due to nation-wide family-planning programs, Uzbekistan's population will increase from 22.2 million in 1997 to 32 million in 2010. As a result, the number of new entrants to workforce by the year 2010 will grow by 61 percent.¹⁸⁷ More explicitly, the working-age population of Uzbekistan will increase by one million by the year 2000. However, the total number of employees has been declining since 1993. Furthermore, even today, the statistics of IMF and UN show that the number of underemployed, people on short-time working and on indefinite unpaid leave, is between one and four million out of an economically active 8.9 million.¹⁸⁸

There are also two other factors that will likely worsen the ethnic relations. First, as it is shown in Table 3.3, Uzbeks continued to experience rapid urban growth that will transform rural unemployment into urban unemployment and lead to ever greater contact and competition between Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population in the near future.¹⁸⁹ Second, according to Professor M. Brill Olcott, since the youth of both Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking minorities are no longer being raised in an atmosphere of communality and cooperation as their elders were, they will certainly be more prone to more violent competition.¹⁹⁰ Also in Professor Khazanov's view,¹⁹¹

In professional, educational, and linguistic respects new migrants to Central Asian cities are at a disadvantage and meet strong competition from other ethnic groups. . . . It is just these people, unemployed and often homeless, who constitute a new and growing underclass in Central Asian cities. Dissatisfied, alienated, angry, and sometimes desperate, they are often particularly hostile toward the Russians and other ethnic minorities and prove to be particularly prone to extremism, violence, and crimes.

In conclusion, it is found that, first, every Central Asian state has an Uzbek community near to their common border with Uzbekistan. Secondly, still considering themselves superior than Uzbeks, the Russian-speaking minorities of Uzbekistan are living in closed communities with a minimum contact

¹⁸⁷ Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 35-41.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Kaser, The Economies of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997) 7; Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 3rd quarter 1996 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996) 68; Country Profile: Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1995-96 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996) 116.

¹⁸⁹ Robert J. Kaiser, "Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia," in Robert A. Lewis, ed., Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 1992) 293.

¹⁹⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, "Ethnic Violence in Central Asia: Perceptions and Misperceptions," in Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change, (Chevy Chase, MD: The Center for Post-Soviet Studies, 1995.)

¹⁹¹ Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) 119-120.

with the Uzbeks. Their arrogant attitudes and ignorance of Uzbek language, customs, and habits resemble the behavior of Meshketians in the 1980s. As a result of current downward emigration trend, they will try to continue to reside in Uzbekistan without changing their habits. Third, the human rights policy of Uzbekistan is not observed to be a reason for ethnic conflicts. Quite the contrary, Patriarch Aleksei II has stated that the Uzbek government's policy toward Orthodox Christians is one of the measures which has reduced migration of the Russian-speaking population from Uzbekistan. Finally, the population growth of Uzbeks will cause the growth of urbanization and unemployment among them that will increase the likelihood of adverse contact and competition between Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE REACTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS

This chapter analyzes the probable reactions of Uzbek minorities and the Russian Federation to ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan. First, it presents that there is a strong solidarity among Uzbeks of Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. Therefore, it speculates that if there is a conflict between Uzbeks and Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in neighboring countries will entangle in this conflict on behalf of their brethren. Secondly, the chapter shows that the Russian Federation does not have any choice other than intervention in conflicts if the Russian-speaking population is one of the conflicting parties. The last argument of this chapter is an assessment that, due to its military ineptness, the Russian Federation cannot be successful in stopping conflicts.

A. UZBEK MINORITIES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Relations between Uzbek minorities and Uzbekistan since 1991 prove that there is a strong solidarity among the Uzbeks. One example of this solidarity was demonstrated by the Uzbeks of Kyrgyzstan during the Osh-1990 conflict which is explained in Chapter II. The next one occurred in March 1993, when Uzbekistan conducted an unusual military exercise in Kyrgyzstan's Osh region. It was unusual, according to independent press of Kyrgyzstan, because Uzbekistan had not received permission from Kyrgyzstan before the exercise.¹⁹² The only official who approved the exercise was the local governor of Osh. After the exercise finished, Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan and dismissed the governor of Osh. According to the agreement, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan would conduct military training on each other's territory.¹⁹³ One reason for Kyrgyzstan's compliance was the political activities of its Uzbek minority. Leaders of the strongest opposition to the president of Kyrgyzstan were and are Uzbek politicians of Osh. One of their persistent demands is a greater political autonomy for Osh that may eventually cause Osh's unification with Uzbekistan. Their introduction of a new anthem for the Osh region in November 1993, was an indicator of their demand.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Bess A. Brown, "Security Concerns of the Central Asian States," in Jed C. Snyder, ed., After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia (Washington, DC: NDU Press Publications, 1995) 77.

¹⁹³ Martha B. Olcott, Central Asia's New States (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 107.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

The Uzbeks of Afghanistan are more prone to cooperation with Uzbekistan than the Uzbeks of Osh. Afghani Uzbeks live mainly in northern Afghanistan which was ruled by Uzbek Bukharan Khanate until the middle of 18th century.¹⁹⁵ According to Professor Magnus, existence of Turkic groups in the Afghan area can be traced back to the fourth century AD.¹⁹⁶ They were these groups that adopted Uzbek as their common name during the reign of Uzbeg Khan. From the beginning of Russian conquest of Central Asia to the end of Stalin's collectivization in the 1930s, the number of Uzbeks and other Turkic groups in Afghanistan was substantially increased because of their migration from Central Asia.¹⁹⁷ However, they never perceived themselves as an integral part of the so-called Afghan nation. On the contrary, they always try to preserve their cultural ties with the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan. Even the Communist coup in 1978 was seen by both Uzbeks of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan as an opportunity to strengthen ties.¹⁹⁸

Relations between the Afghani Uzbeks and Uzbekistan have significantly increased since the end of Russian occupation in Afghanistan and the independence of Uzbekistan. In Professor Magnus's view,¹⁹⁹

[Afghani] Uzbeks have felt the attraction and inducements of closer ties with Uzbekistan, especially after 1991 when Tashkent became the capital of an independent state, and one is closely attuned to the welfare of co-ethnics along its borders in both Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

In 1988, in the opinion of Professor Eden Naby, "The key to the future of the country [Afghanistan] may in fact rest with the Turkic people of the northern plains."²⁰⁰ In 1995, six provinces (Faryab, Jozjan, Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan and Kunduz)²⁰¹ in the north were under the control of Dostum, an Afghani Uzbek General. His control over those provinces included an effective administration with tax collection and other state functions.²⁰² Moreover, in the same year, Dostum stated that if Pushtuns (dominant ethnic

¹⁹⁵ Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Surrey: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1995) 21.

¹⁹⁶ Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) 72.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁹⁸ Eden Naby, "Ethnic Factors in Afghanistan's Future," in Bo Hultdt and Erland Jansson, eds., The Tragedy of Afghanistan (New York: Croom Helm, 1988) 67.

¹⁹⁹ Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, 119.

²⁰⁰ Eden Naby, "Ethnic Factors in Afghanistan's Future," 66.

²⁰¹ Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, "Afghanistan and Central Asia," in Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 7 (July 1995): 623.

²⁰² Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, 294; Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan," in Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 7 (July 1995): 629.

group of Afghanistan since the middle of 18th century which has been represented by *the Taleban* since November 1994) attacked them, he would declare the independence of the Republic of South Turkistan.²⁰³ After Dostum's statement, the Taleban attacked the 'Turkic people of the northern plains' two times in May and September 1997, in order to unify Afghanistan under the Pushtuns. Dostum has not yet declared independence, however. Perhaps, the main reason for his delay is the two victories²⁰⁴ of the "Turkic people of the northern plains" over the Taleban as a response to the attacks of the latter. Nevertheless, the Afghani Uzbeks have not abandoned their demand for at least an autonomous region in the northern Afghanistan. For example, after their first victory over the Taleban, they put forward the following proposals in order to bring peace to Afghanistan:²⁰⁵

- (1) The Taleban would let northern groups keep exclusive control of the north;
- (2) It would stop trying to disarm opposition fighters;
- (3) It would agree to an Islamic dispensation.

The main sponsor of the Afghani Uzbeks, on the other hand, has been Uzbekistan since 1991.²⁰⁶ According to the President of Uzbekistan, his country would "do everything possible so that Dostum will prevent the Taleban militia" from advancing north.²⁰⁷ In this context, there were some unconfirmed claims of independent sources that Uzbekistan provided the Afghani Uzbeks with at least six Mi-32 helicopters which might have been piloted by Uzbek pilots during the first fighting in May 1997.²⁰⁸

Unlike the Uzbeks of Afghanistan and Osh, the Uzbeks of Tajikistan are administrating almost all Tajikistan with political, economic and military support of Uzbekistan. When Tajik SSR was created in 1929, Khojand region with its highly developed Uzbek population was transferred from Uzbek SSR to Tajik jurisdiction. Until the Great Purge of Stalin at the end of 1930s, top leaders of Tajik SSR were

²⁰³ Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 142.

²⁰⁴ The first one was in May 1997. Charles Clover, "Afghanistan: Taleban may try to avenge defeat in north," Financial Times, May 30, 1997. The second one happened in October 1997. Meredith Buel, "The Taleban losses came after repeated attacks by opposition forces," Voice of America, October 4, 1997.

²⁰⁵ "Pakistan says Taleban accept Uzbek foe's terms," Reuters, June 5, 1997. Meredith Buel, "Afghan peace proposals," Voice of America, June 5, 1997. (Emphasis mine.)

²⁰⁶ Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, "Afghanistan and Central Asia," 616.

²⁰⁷ Bruce Pannier, "The Almaty Conference: a common front or further evidence of individual interests?" OMRI Analytical Brief, October 8, 1996

²⁰⁸ "A little help from across the border," Asia Times, June 3, 1997.

the politicians from Khojand. By 1946 the Khojandis were in power again. They administered Tajik SSR, then Tajikistan, until 1992.²⁰⁹ After disintegration of the USSR, Tajikistan became an “independent” and “democratic” state. Simultaneously, democratic political parties were established by the citizens of Tajikistan. They were “pro-Communist” parties of Khojandis, Kulobis and Hissaris, and “pro-Islamist” parties of Gorno-Badakshanis and Gharmis. In fact, “pro-Communists” were Uzbeks whereas “pro-Islamists” were Pamiri people of Tajikistan.²¹⁰ Just after independence in November 1991, “communist” Rahmon Nabiev from Khojand was elected as the President of Tajikistan. However, ‘Islamists’ from Gorno-Badakshan strongly opposed to Nabiev and forcibly ousted him in September 1992. Simultaneously, a full scale civil war developed in Tajikistan between pro-Communists and pro-Islamists. The Russian 201st Division and the Uzbek Army and Air Force, also, began their peacekeeping activities on behalf of the communists. In October 1992, the Tajik Parliament opened in the city of Khojand instead of Dushanbe, (the capital of Tajikistan,) and communist Emomali Rahmonov from Kulob was elected as Speaker of the Parliament. Two years after, Rahmonov became the President of Tajikistan as a result of presidential election and support of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation.²¹¹ He is still the President of Tajikistan as of October 1997. Also, during the initial stage of civil war, the Uzbeks of Khojand demanded that their region be united with Uzbekistan. Although their demand was rejected by the President of Uzbekistan, prospect of unification in the future remained high.²¹²

B. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On the other hand, an ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Russians in the future will likely cause the Russian Federation’s intervention. This will complicate the international relations in Central Asia and probably the internal stability of the Russian Federation. According to Vice-President of the Russian Center for Strategic Research and International Studies, Dr. Zviagelskaia, the Russian Federation’s long-term interests in Central Asia are the following:²¹³

²⁰⁹ Donald S. Carlisle, “Geopolitics of Uzbekistan,” in Yaacov Ro’i, ed., Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (Portland: FRANK CASS, 1995) 84.

²¹⁰ Nassim Jawad and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War (The UK: Minority Rights Group, 1995) 7; Mark N. Katz, “Central Asian Stability: Under Threat?” SAIS Review (Winter-Spring 1997): 36.

²¹¹ Nassim Jawad and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Tajikistan: A Forgotten Civil War, 15-7.

²¹² Donald S. Carlisle, “Geopolitics of Uzbekistan,” 86.

²¹³ Zviagelskaia, Irina., The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 8.

- (1) Political and economic stability (the absence of interstate and internal conflicts and acute economic crises);
- (2) The preservation of the various contacts between Russia and the Central Asian countries and the prevention of a vacuum that can be filled with forces hostile to Russia;
- (3) Ensuring Central Asia's ecological security;
- (4) The prevention of the spread of chauvinism and Islamic extremism;
- (5) The prevention of terrorism, drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling;
- (6) The preservation of communications crossing Russia and access to new transport arteries and to oil and gas pipelines oriented to the "far abroad"; and
- (7) Ensuring the security of the Russian population.

Furthermore, Dr. Zviagelskaia states that conflicts and the fate of the Russian-speaking population, in addition to political Islam, are the most common subjects that are used in the internal political struggle in the Russian Federation. Dr. Zviagelskaia's comments on this subject later were also supported by preeminent American and Russian scholars in a study in 1996. As they wrote regarding the Russian Federation's interventions in the ethnic conflicts in Ossetia-Ingushetia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Trans-Dniestr and Georgia-Abkhazia,²¹⁴

A related motivation behind the intervention decisions [of the Russian Federation] . . . has been a felt need to 'look good,' or to save face. . . . Similar pressures to 'look good' figured in the roles played by various actors leading up to Russia's assault on Grozny in December 1994. Finally, intervention decisions have been made . . . from time to time for no more profound reason than the absence of any better ideas.

According to A. Migranyan, advisor of President Yeltsin and a member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation, their decisions on Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Trans-Dniestr conflicts were just the results of their feeling that the Russian Federation had to save its face. Migranyan writes that "Russia would not be able to 'sit out' events occurring outside the borders of the Russian Federation

²¹⁴ J. Azrael, B. S. Lambeth, E. A. Payin, and A. A. Popov, "Russian and American Intervention Policy in Comparative Perspective," in J. R. Azrael and E. A. Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) 4.

without intervening in conflicts along the perimeter of those borders.”²¹⁵ Also, in 1995, declaring that “there may be cases when the use of direct military force may be needed to protect our compatriots abroad,” former Foreign Minister Kozyrev further emphasized their willingness to save the face of the Russian Federation.²¹⁶

Mr. Kozyrev’s statement on this issue was only one of the Russian politicians’ expressions that they were ready to protect ethnic Russians abroad.²¹⁷ Their reason for these expressions was the coming elections for deputies to the State Duma of the Second Russian Federation Federal Assembly in December 1995 and for the presidential election in 1996. According to public opinion polls at the end of May 1995, President Boris Yeltsin was still standing behind Mr. Yavlinsky and Mr. Zhirinovskiy.²¹⁸ In the 1991 presidential elections, Mr. Zhirinovskiy was one of the candidates who received six million votes just for saying he would defend Russians abroad.²¹⁹ With 6.2 million votes, about seven percent of the total, Mr. Zhirinovskiy was behind Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Ryzhkov. However, in the parliamentary election of December 1993, Mr. Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party became the first party in the lower-house State Duma by winning 22.8 percent of the total votes. According to a Russian daily, the Liberal Democratic Party’s social base included “Russians in the nearby countries” besides the military-industrial complex, the Army, the impoverished section of the former Soviet middle class, pensioners, a section of the working class, and young people.²²⁰

In order to prevent Mr. Zhirinovskiy’s rising, on November 2, 1993, just prior to the December 1993 parliamentary election, the Russian Federation Security Council approved a new Russian military doctrine which contained a provision that suggested the use of the Russian military forces to protect the interests of Russians living in the FSU.²²¹ Thereafter, the Zhirinovskiy factor has continued to play a decisive role in the formulation of Russian policies toward the Russian-speaking populations of the FSU. In the first round of 1996 presidential election, Mr. Zhirinovskiy was again one of the leading candidates with 5.7 percent of the total votes behind Mr. Yeltsin (35.2 percent), Mr. Zyuganov (32 percent), Mr.

²¹⁵ Andranik Migranyan, “Russia and the Near Abroad,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVI, No. 6 (1994): 3.

²¹⁶ Lee Hockstader, “Moscow Vows to Defend Ethnic Russians Abroad,” International Herald Tribune, April 19, 1995.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ Fred Schulze and Ann C. Bigelow, eds., Russia’s Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995 (Columbus, OH: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1996) 20.

²¹⁹ James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist (Washington, DC: NDU Press Publications, 1995).

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

Lebed, and Mr. Yavlinsky.²²² Mr. Zhirinovsky's platform in this election included a list of "eight guarantees" in which the seventh reaffirmed his continuous support for Russians abroad.²²³

Because of Mr. Zhirinovsky's political activities on behalf of the Russians abroad, the Russian Federation established the Institute of Problems of the Diaspora and Integration two months before the 1996 presidential election. The director of the Institute was Mr. Konstantin Zatulin, former head of the Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs. The institute's scholarly body would be headed by Mr. Andranik Migranyan. The supervisory council would include Russian Federation Minister for CIS Affairs, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director of the Federal Television and Radio Service, editor-in-chief of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, head of the Federal Migration Service, eminent diplomats, scholars, and entrepreneurs. In addition to political, cultural, and economic studies, "the institute will monitor ethno-social and military-political conflicts in the CIS. . . and develop recommendations for settling or preventing conflicts and for . . . peacekeeping operations."²²⁴ One statement of Mr. Konstantin Zatulin on May 6, 1997, was about the fate of near abroad that shows the Zhirinovsky factor was still alive in the internal politics of the Russian Federation even after the presidential elections of 1996. Mr. Zatulin's statement was follows:²²⁵

So, I would like to stress that, as we have always said in our Institute, in the Duma and in the Presidential Council, the fate of the "near abroad" . . . and the fate of Russia are inseparably bound up.

Therefore, it can be concluded that if there is a conflict between the Russian-speaking and the indigenous populations in Uzbekistan in the future, and if the situation of Russian-speaking population requires protection, the Russian Federation will likely try to protect the Russian-speaking compatriots in order to ensure internal political stability of the Russian Federation. Also, it can be assumed that the Russian-speaking population will be in need of protection since the initial outcome of these conflicts depend on numerical strength of conflicting parties.

²²² "First Round 1996 Presidential Election Candidates and Results," *Russia Today* at <http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/special/elect/round1.html>.

²²³ "Presidential Platform of Vladimir Zhirinovsky," *Russia Today* at <http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/bio/platzhir.html>

²²⁴ Natalya Konstantinova, "Institute of Diaspora and Integration is Founded," *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 16 (1996): 22-3.

²²⁵ "Press conference with Konstantin Zatulin, Director, Institute for Diaspora and Integration of the CIS Countries, May 6, 1997," *Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast*, May 6, 1997. (Emphasis mine.)

However, as it was seen in the Chechnya example, interventions in conflicts may not save the face of the Russian Federation. The Chechnya adventure of the Yeltsin administration began in October 1991, when the Chechen-Ingush Republic (CIR) declared its independence from the Russian Federation. As a consequence of this declaration, the Russian Federation imposed a state of emergency on the CIR on November 7, 1991. Until December 1993, the Russian government's position in regard to the CIR remained unchanged.²²⁶ It was the victory of Mr. Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 elections for the State Duma that forced President Yeltsin to change his policy toward the CIR. In one political commentator's view,²²⁷

The key role in the Duma will most likely be played by Zhirinovsky's faction. . . As a result, there will be times when the Yeltsinists not only cannot get their own decisions through but are not even able to block 'harmful' draft constitutional laws. . . . Unless Zhirinovsky comes to the aid of [Yeltsinists].

Furthermore, just a few days after the parliamentary elections, Mr. Zhirinovsky declared that he would run for President of Russia in the next presidential election.²²⁸ Because of Mr. Zhirinovsky's enormous pressure, the Russian administration changed its policy toward Chechnya in the middle of 1994. First, they initiated a covert operation to overthrow the president of the CIR. However, the operation resulted in failure on November 26, 1994, when the tanks with Russian crews surrendered on the streets of Chechnya's capital.²²⁹ Three days after this failure, in a meeting of the Russian Security Council, President Yeltsin decided to send regular troops to Chechnya in order to 'look good.' According to Emil Payin, "A more likely explanation of the decision to invade has to do with Yeltsin's belief that 'a small and triumphant war' would improve his prospects for reelection" in the 1996 presidential elections.²³⁰

²²⁶ Emil A. Payin and Arkady A. Popov, "Chechnya," in J. R. Azrael and E. A. Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) 11-20.

²²⁷ Nikolai Troitsky, "Senators' and Duma members don't promise a quiet life," in Fred Schulze and Ann C. Bigelow, eds., Russia's Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995 (Columbus, OH: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1996) 4.

²²⁸ Aleksandr Shalnev, "Zhirinovsky celebrates his victory and prepares for a presidential election," in Fred Schulze and Ann C. Bigelow, eds., Russia's Parliamentary Elections 1993 and 1995 (Columbus, OH: The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1996) 5.

²²⁹ Pavel Felgenhauer, "The Chechen Campaign," in Mikhail Tsyppin, ed., War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996) 41.

²³⁰ Emil A. Payin and Arkady A. Popov, "Chechnya," in J. R. Azrael and E. A. Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) 25. Mr. Emil Payin, in his own account, was a member of the President's Analytical Center in 1994 and prepared a report for President Yeltsin in September 1994 entitled "On the Political Situation in the Chechen Republic."

The operation against Chechnya was launched on December 11, 1994. At the beginning, the Russian forces had an 8-to-1 advantage in manpower. Two weeks after, their advantage increased to 19-to-1. However, in the first eighteen days of fighting, the 255th and 33^d Regiments of the Russian Federation were completely destroyed by Chechnya's army of 3,000. The 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade also experienced a defeat during the attack to Grozny, the capital of Chechnya.²³¹ In P. Felgenhauer's words, "The Chechen campaign should have been a showcase of rapid deployment and success by [Russian Defense Minister] Grachev's mobile forces, but it turned into a disaster."²³²

What are the reasons for this disaster? To Felgenhauer, the reasons were low manpower, lack of training, and low morale of the Russian forces due to the lack of funds.²³³ For Yeltsin administration and the Russian military, the disaster in Chechnya was the result of the current structure of the Russian Armed Forces that required a substantial reform in order to be a reliable force. As President Yeltsin stated in February 1995, "the army is slowly beginning to get out of hand—the conflict in Chechnya convinced us once more that we are late with reform of the army."²³⁴ According to the Russian Defense Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, there was only one cause for the slow pace of reform—the weakening of the country's economy, or in other words the lack of enough funds available to the Russian military.²³⁵

In a few words, the Russian military reform plan conceived bringing the total strength of the armed forces down to 1.5 million by the year 1999 or 2000 and the creation of rapid deployment forces equipped with, for example, directed energy weapons, automatic and automated high-precision systems, deep-penetration ammunition, and super high-speed data-processing and electronic warfare equipment.²³⁶ However, the economic situation of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was not ready to support this type of expensive equipment. Even the soldiers of the army could not be fed normally and the officers were living in undesirable conditions because of financial difficulties.²³⁷

²³¹ Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 18-9, 39.

²³² Pavel Felgenhauer, "The Chechen Campaign," 42.

²³³ Ibid., 42-3.

²³⁴ Vitaly Shlykov, "The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces," in Mikhail Tsypkin, ed., War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1996) 62.

²³⁵ Ibid., 62.

²³⁶ Ibid., 59 and Richard F. Staar, The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 192.

²³⁷ Vitaly Shlykov, "The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces," 62-3.

In 1997, the Russian military still is in need of reform and money. Moreover, the near future does not assure anything other than the continuation of the situation. In Russian Defense Minister's words in July 1997,²³⁸

It is hard to make promises now, when there is no money, but under the macro-economic indicators we plan to double officers' wages by the year 2001 and increase them by about 2.5 times by the year 2005.

On the other hand, as of July 1997, ninety-five thousand officers did not have their own place to live, many of them were living in railway carriages, garages, tents, and their workplaces. Also they had not been paid and they had not flown, sailed, and trained for months.²³⁹

It is very likely that they were these kind of economic difficulties that compelled some Russian servicemen in Tajikistan to behave in an undisciplined way. As Arkady Dubnov writes that,²⁴⁰

[In Tajikistan], there were many episodes involving illicit sales or theft of Russian armored vehicles, tanks, and equipment. Some Russian servicemen sold and rented military supplies directly to the guerrillas. One officer of the Kulyab [Kulob] regiment . . . stated that, "I'll sell an armored vehicle and buy myself a home in Russia. I do need a place to live afterwards.

Moreover, according to Moscow correspondent of *Time*, Tajikistan and the Russian 201st Division in Tajikistan became an important drug center in the last few years. The correspondent of *Time* argues that,²⁴¹

Russia's 201st Division, . . . , is nicknamed "Shop Number One." The 201st, it is said, beats the local pharmacy for its range of drugs. "Hash, weed, opium--you name it," reports an aid worker who admits buying hashish from the "peacekeepers." In recent years, drugs have also turned up, more than once, on Russian military aircraft. Moscow's troops, of course, are not the only ones seduced by drug profits.

²³⁸ "Defense Minister seeks Yeltsin's help," *Russia Today*, July 21, 1997.

²³⁹ "Russia grasps at essential military reform," *Russia Today*, July 18, 1997; "Defense Minister seeks Yeltsin's help," *Russia Today*, July 21, 1997; "Yeltsin orders Russian military to explain reforms," *Russia Today*, July 22, 1997; "Nemtsov on paying soldiers' wage arrears," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty NewsLine*, July 23, 1997; "Rokhlin slams military reform plans and mixed reactions to Rokhlin initiative," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty NewsLine*, July 23, 1997; "Generals says Russian Army faces collapse," *Russia Today*, August 5, 1997.

²⁴⁰ Arkady Yu. Dubnov, "Tadjikistan," in J. R. Azrael and E. A. Payin, eds., *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) 44.

²⁴¹ Andrew Meier, "Opium highway," *Time* (February 24, 1997): 46.

In conclusion, first, it is obvious that there is a strong solidarity among the Uzbeks. Currently, the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan are supporting their brethren in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan against their adversaries. The Uzbeks in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also been yearning for unification with Uzbekistan since 1991. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Uzbeks abroad cannot stay indifferent if there is an ethnic conflict between the Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan.

Secondly, it is also obvious that if there is a conflict between the Uzbeks and the Russian-speaking population, the Russian Federation will try to protect the latter in order to ensure its own political stability and save the face of Russian politicians. However, contrary to the expectations, intervention of the Russian Federation on behalf of the Russian-speaking population will result in another disaster.

V. ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF UZBEKISTAN

This chapter examines the economic situation of Uzbekistan and suggests that it is the modest economic progress of Uzbekistan that has provided peace between its ethnic groups since 1992. Secondly, it analyzes the requirements of the continuity for economic progress.

Just after independence, *the Economist* asked whether or not Uzbekistan might experience social upheaval as a result of rapidly deteriorating living standards.²⁴² Although an explosion has not yet been experienced, its realization is getting closer. According to Susan Sachs, Moscow correspondent of *Newsday*, women from Margilan were complaining in August 1997 that there was no work and that they could barely afford bread.²⁴³ Located on the outskirts of Fergana, Margilan has always been ready to exhibit unrest. Since the beginning of 1996, *the Economist* again has warned its readers about the social and economic situation of Uzbekistan.

According to 1996 country reports of *the Economist Intelligence Unit*, foreign sources in Tashkent claimed that there was growing economic discontent among agricultural sector workers, particularly in the densely populated Fergana valley.²⁴⁴ *The Economist* also claimed in October 1996 that political risk was rising because the population--especially in agricultural sector--was for the first time starting to challenge President Islam Karimov's hard-line rule.²⁴⁵ Almost one year later, in June 1997, again according to *the Economist*, Uzbekistan's economic decline was quickly gathering pace and, as a result of this trend, an economic shock was not far off.²⁴⁶

There are two reasons for recent economic decline and growing discontent among rural population: (1) the peculiarity of economic reform program of Uzbekistan, (2) the structure of economy which cannot be sustained any longer by limited and degraded resources (capital, water and land). The reform program of Uzbekistan is peculiar because it is designed only according to special 'national composition' and political stability requirements of Uzbekistan without taking into consideration the limits of its current resources. This reform program which is presented in the first section of this chapter

²⁴² "Uzbekistan: Drifting towards danger," *The Economist* (November 9, 1991): 58.

²⁴³ Susan Sachs, "Central Asia's awakening," *Newsday* (Nassau and Suffolk edition), August 17, 1997.

²⁴⁴ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 3rd quarter 1996* (London: 1996) 44.

²⁴⁵ "Business outlook in Uzbekistan," *Economist Intelligence Unit Business Eastern Europe*, October 28, 1996.

²⁴⁶ "Business outlook in Uzbekistan," *Economist Intelligence Unit Business Eastern Europe*, June 9, 1997.

has been successful up until now. However, as it is analyzed in the second section, the continuity of success requires the exploitation of other potential resources of Uzbekistan.

A. TRANSITION FROM PLAN TO MARKET

The economy of Uzbekistan was conducted according to socialist principles until it became obvious that socialism was a recipe for disaster. After comprehension of this fact, Uzbekistan, like other socialist countries, determined to transform its economic policy from socialism to capitalism. It was a policy of “transition from plan to market” as it is widely known. Principles of this policy are the following:²⁴⁷

- | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|--|
| (1) | Liberalization: | Freeing up prices, trade, and entry to market; moving to convertible monetary system; applying market-determined interest rates; |
| (2) | Stabilization: | Reducing inflation; imposing hard budget and credit policy; containing internal and external imbalances; |
| (3) | Privatization: | Privatizing existing state enterprises and supporting the development of a new private sector; |
| (4) | Institutional reform: | Establishing clear property rights, legal and financial infrastructure and effective government; strengthening the rule of law according to the demands of market. |

As it is expressed in Chapter I, Professor Campbell adds two more principles: “opening the economy to the external world” and “creating a system of social protection against the costs the transition imposed on the population.”²⁴⁸ Otherwise, Professor Campbell implies, “transition from plan to market” may result in social explosions.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ Shafiqul Islam, “Conclusion: Problems of Planning a Market Economy,” in Shafiqul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) 183; The World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: 1996) 22.

²⁴⁸ Robert W. Campbell, “Economic Reform in the USSR and its Successor States,” in Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States, 106.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 135.

According to the World Bank, there are two patterns of reform: (1) the all-out approach which aims to implement the four principles of transition in a single burst of reforms, and (2) the gradual transition in accordance with inherited economic structure and non-economic factors. In the second approach, political structure, history, culture, and geography of a country may be taken into consideration as non-economic factors.²⁵⁰

Uzbekistan chose the second approach which was labeled as the “Uzbek model” by Rustam Dosumov.²⁵¹ In the opinion of Mr. Dosumov, (chairman of the Department of Industrial Management and Marketing at Tashkent State Technical University and an ardent supporter of official economic policy,) there were social, economic, demographic, geostrategic, historical and psychological conditions in Uzbekistan that compelled them to choose the gradual transition path. Of those conditions, the second and the third were the following: the complexity and uniqueness of the demographic situation, and the particular national composition of the republic. Because of these conditions, in his view, their model observed the following principles:²⁵²

- (1) The priority of economics over politics;
- (2) The supremacy of law and order;
- (3) Implementation of a strong social policy that takes into account the demographic structure of the country;
- (4) The gradual, evolutionary formation of a market economy;
- (5) The priority of the state in conducting the economic reform; and
- (6) The adherence to a separate path for building the new society.

Although Mr. Dosumov insistently utilizes “demographic situation,” “national composition” and “demographic structure,” these terms can very well be taken into account as “ethnic structure.” Therefore, one of the main reasons of “Uzbek model” is the existence of Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan. Uzbek economists simply wanted to protect the Russian-speaking population’s well-being and prevent their emigration from Uzbekistan. With the words of Mr. Dosumov, their emigration was

²⁵⁰ The World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: 1996) 9-11.

²⁵¹ Rustam Dosumov, “Uzbekistan: A National Path to the Market,” in Boris Rumer, ed., Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996) 147.

²⁵² Ibid., 145.

a “loss” for Uzbekistan and “that loss must be taken into account” because they were the only skillful workers and managers in Uzbekistan.²⁵³ Perhaps, Mr. Dosumov’s perception that Uzbekistan was in need of skillful Russian-speaking population was not a demonstration of his colonial education in Russian,²⁵⁴ since the Russian-speaking population was and is one of the realities of Uzbekistan. However, it is another reality that the “Uzbek model” was not a sound model for transition from plan to market. Considering the principle of “the priority of the state in conducting the economic reform,” it may even be argued that transition to market with their model is impossible.

In fact, after four years of transition, the outcome of the Uzbek model was behind that of almost all of the other transition economies. In other words, there was little, if any, transition from plan to market. According to European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), neither of the four principles of transition had been realized in Uzbekistan by mid-1995.²⁵⁵ In privatization, only 25 percent of large-scale state-owned enterprise assets were privatized or in the process of being sold. Private sector share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only 30 percent, whereas it was 60 percent in Albania, 40 percent in Kyrgyzstan and higher than 30 percent in another 15 transitional countries.²⁵⁶ Moreover, because of Uzbek government’s adherence to the principle of “the priority of the state in conducting the economic reform,” privatization was conducted in a very different way. Uzbek government continued to retain majority of interests in “strategic sectors,” such as energy, fuel and gold mining. In non-strategic sectors, more than 50 percent of shares were allocated to their workers and managers while the rest was retained by the government. However, workers’ and managers’ shares were non-tradable. In agriculture, the Uzbek government simply transformed state farms into cooperatives or closed joint-stock companies (with non-tradable shares) without any major impact on enterprise behavior. By early 1995, these “private” farms controlled 90 percent of agricultural land.²⁵⁷ According to EBRD, the Uzbek way of privatization that concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders (workers and managers) could

²⁵³ Ibid., 159-63.

²⁵⁴ Although his most recent book was written and published in Russian, Mr. Dosumov does not claim in “Uzbekistan: A National Path to the Market” that the Uzbeks lack the natural ability of Europeans since Uzbeks’ brains are supposedly smaller than Europeans. It is known that this claim was made in 1990 by Yusuf Shodimentov who became chief of the Science and Education Department in the Uzbek government in 1994. Y. Shodimentov’s this account was given in “Uzbekistan: Tamerlane v. Marx,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1994).

²⁵⁵ “EBRD Transition Report, 1995,” Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

²⁵⁶ There are 25 countries in transition in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

²⁵⁷ “EBRD Transition Report, 1995, Transition Indicators: Uzbekistan,” Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

undermine prospects for rapid restructuring of economic system. Additionally, re-registration of state farms in new forms of collective ownership would prevent the effective governance and performance.²⁵⁸

In the area of liberalization, Uzbekistan was again behind Albania, Kyrgyzstan and the other 16 transitional countries by mid-1995.²⁵⁹ First of all, there was not any liberalization in trade since the bulk of foreign trade was still channeled through state-owned foreign trade companies. Secondly, price liberalization and state order were not phased out for agricultural products, such as for cotton. Thirdly, liberalization of wages was not realized.²⁶⁰ Although the Uzbek government was committed to raising real wages in the past few years, it was widely applied in urban areas and not to the agricultural sector.²⁶¹

Uzbekistan's record in other dimensions, also, was not better than that of privatization and liberalization. On the institutional reform dimension of transition, for example, Uzbekistan's grade was only better than Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. According to the report of the EBRD, the legal rules on investment were often unclear, legal advice was often difficult to obtain, judicial and administrative support of the law was rudimentary and administration of the law was deficient.²⁶² In the words of the *Economist Intelligence Unit*,²⁶³

The government approaches foreign investment in a traditional Soviet-style manner. Foreign firms which have technology and processes unavailable to Uzbek . . . are allowed in. However, foreign investment to stimulate management transfer and introduce competition to the local market is still excluded.

For Uzbek economists, it was not the continuity of tradition. Victor Chjen, (deputy prime minister and head of the state privatization committee as of April 1996,) for example, argues that they invented their model which had some features similar to other states but had no analogy elsewhere in regard to their specific measures.²⁶⁴ The reasons of their unusual measures can be found in the following table.

²⁵⁸ "EBRD Transition Report, 1995," Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ "EBRD Transition Report, 1995, Transition Indicators: Uzbekistan," Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

²⁶¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 3rd quarter 1996 (London: 1996) 47.

²⁶² "EBRD Transition Report, 1995," Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

²⁶³ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1995-1996 (London: 1996) 112.

²⁶⁴ "Uzbekistan," Euromoney Worldlink Magazine (March/April 1996).

Table 5.1 Revenue and Expenditures²⁶⁵
(as shares of GDP)

	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>
Total Revenue (% of GDP)	45.5	34.2	60.9
Tax	17.7	28.1	49.2
Union Grants	19.5	-	-
Others	8.3	6.1	11.7
Total Expenditures (% of GDP)	50.6	45.2	56.5
National Economy	18.0	3.7	3.4
Social and Cultural Programs	17.9	16.7	17.5
Subsidies	8.6	11.8	12.3
State Capital and Investments	na	2.9	4.7
Others	6.1	10.1	18.4
Deficit (% of GDP)	-5.1	-11.0	+4.4

As it is presented in Table 5.1, the Uzbek government had to maintain a high level of expenditures in order to protect its population from the adverse effects of its declining economy. From the very beginning, the Uzbek economists' main goal was to provide a stable social-political situation in Uzbekistan. For the realization of this goal, in their opinion, they should implement strong social protection measures at the expense of the stabilization principle of transition. Although this recipe was a result of Uzbek economists' misunderstanding of the principles of economics, it helped to maintain the internal peace up to now. For example, according to Uzbek economists, it was the recommendations of international economic and financial organizations (IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD) that caused the most rapid deregulation of prices and foreign trade in many countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the contrary, they argue, it was their model of transition that provided distinctly better economic and social performance.²⁶⁶ Instead of contemporary economic principles, even some Uzbek economists take the following lines of famous Uzbek poet Mir Ali Shir Nawaiy (1441-1501) as their guide to the future:²⁶⁷

You set out on your way--but what obstacles stand in your way!
O, how difficult it is to reach your goal.

²⁶⁵ The World Bank, *Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform* (Washington, DC: 1993) 16.

²⁶⁶ Rustam Dosumov, "Uzbekistan: A National Path to the Market," 145-50.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 149.

However, it is obvious that the obstacles that stand in their way included the budget deficits. Although, according to their accounts, their budget gave a surplus in 1993, there was a deficit of 12.2 percent in the estimates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Also, according to IMF, the budget deficit was 17.7 percent of GDP in 1994 and 7 percent in 1995.²⁶⁸ They accommodated this deficit in three ways: inflation, external debt and exploitation of agriculture.

First of all, as it is presented in Table 5.2, the increased government expenditures were financed through a huge growth of money in circulation which eventually caused very high inflation rates. As it is observed by Mr. Garmash, a Russian economist,²⁶⁹

The drop in the population's real monetary income during the reform years (1992-1995) was so catastrophic The level of the population's real income this year [1996] compared to 1991 will be 41% in Russia, . . . , less than 33% in Azerbaijan, 17% to 20% in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan . . . , 10% in Turkmenistan, 6% in Uzbekistan, and 1% in Tajikistan.

Furthermore, detaining wage liberalization in rural areas, the burden of government expenditures was primarily imposed on the rural population.²⁷⁰

Table 5.2 **Money, Consumer Prices and Average Wages²⁷¹**
(% annual average rise)

	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Money (M2) Growth	132.6	406.3	622.2	na
Consumer Prices Index	106.0	527.7	857.1	1,314
Average Wages	-26.6	45.0	6.9	na

²⁶⁸ IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1996 (Washington, DC: 1996) 78 and 92.

²⁶⁹ Vitaly Garmash, "1996: A tough year for most CIS economies," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No.1 (1997): 10.

²⁷⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 3rd quarter 1996 (London: 1996) 47.

²⁷¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1995-1996 (London: 1996) 116-23.

Table 5.3

Wage Differentiation in Selected Sectors²⁷²

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>June 1993</u>
Average	100	100	100	100	100
Industry	107	110	119	130	135
Agriculture	97	102	100	76	59
Science, Research & Development	104	128	105	97	107
Government	93	104	111	109	119

Secondly, the government expenditures were financed through external debt. Total external debt stock of Uzbekistan was \$9.9M at the end of 1992.²⁷³ It rose to 29 percent of GDP in 1996.²⁷⁴ As Mr. Garmash observed in 1996, “some of the positive factors noted this year (the drop in inflation, the reduction of the budget deficit, etc.) resulted mainly from increasing the state debt, especially the foreign debt.”²⁷⁵ Instead of foreign debt, the Uzbek government would have increased its revenues with taxes, if Uzbek economists had been able to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Uzbekistan. Macroeconomic stability and development of effective institutional framework have always been necessary conditions of inflow of the FDI.²⁷⁶ However, Uzbek economists could not succeed in creating these conditions because of their “Uzbek Model” which aimed to keep Uzbekistan politically stable. According to the EBRD’s 1996 Transition Report, cumulative FDI in Uzbekistan in 1996 was on the order of \$342. This amount, as per capita, was 28 times less than Kazakhstan’s, 16 times less than Turkmenistan’s and 3 times less than Kyrgyzstan’s attraction of FDI.²⁷⁷ Had the legal and institutional frameworks been strengthened, FDI flows would have reached \$200 to \$250 million a year.²⁷⁸

The other method to finance government expenditures was the excessive exploitation of agricultural sector. As aforementioned, institutional structure of agricultural sector has remained

²⁷² The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 298, 300.

²⁷³ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1995-1996 (London: 1996) 128.

²⁷⁴ Vitaly Garmash, 10.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁷⁶ “EBRD Transition Report, 1995,” Quest Economics Database (November 1995).

²⁷⁷ Ben Aris, “Investors in Uzbekistan feel cash crunch,” The Moscow Times, July 8, 1997.

²⁷⁸ The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) xxi.

unchanged until now. The state owns the land²⁷⁹ and the water, dictates what farmers produce and the inputs they use, determines prices of inputs and outputs, buys and sells agricultural products.²⁸⁰ Also, the state orders the amount of output (planned output) of farms and the proportion of output that they must sell to government enterprises at prices fixed by the state. According to this “state order system,” first of all, “private” and state-owned farms must fulfill their state order quota before being allowed to market their ‘free’ products again at prices determined by the state. However, since there are no other purchaser, both ‘free’ and ‘quota’ products must be sold to government agencies. The only difference between them is the difference between their prices. For example, the price of 1 MT of seed cotton procured under the state order (quota) will be Som (currency of Uzbekistan) 16,800 and the price of 1 MT of seed cotton procured over the state order (free) will be Som 24,000 in 1998.²⁸¹ Wages of workers are also determined by government and, in theory, paid by ‘private’ or state farms’ administrations. In reality, workers are paid randomly for their labor on the farms. They earn money only by selling their own products (fruit and vegetable) from their own gardens/plots which occupy 9 percent of the arable land of Uzbekistan.²⁸²

Additionally, as it is presented in Table 5.4, domestic prices of agricultural products are always determined below international prices, though they are exported at the latter by the state. The net result of this pricing policy accounts as profit or export taxes that enables Uzbek government to finance its subsidized expenditures.²⁸³ In 1992, profit from agricultural sector was 0.6 billion dollars, equivalent to roughly the total value of food (wheat, sugar, etc.) and energy imports which were distributed to urban population at subsidized prices.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁹ Although 9 percent of the arable land was distributed to peasants, ultimate land ownership was retained by the state. Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 7.

²⁸⁰ The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 118.

²⁸¹ “Uzbekistan annual cotton report of American Embassy, Tashkent,” Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, June 19, 1997.

²⁸² Tom McCray, “Complicating agricultural reforms in Uzbekistan: observations on the lower Zeravshan basin (Part I),” Central Asia Monitor, No. 1 (1997):7-14.

²⁸³ The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 12.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 124, 269.

Table 5.4 Ratio of Domestic to International Prices²⁸⁵

(in percent)

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>
Cotton Fiber	15	6	3	16
Wheat	28	27	9	21
Rice	28	30	9	17

Consequently, the Uzbek way of transition has succeeded in keeping Uzbekistan politically stable until today. Urban population which comprises the bulk of the Russian-speaking population has been subsidized at the expense of the rural population. Wages in scientific, administrative and industrial sector have increased while agricultural workers' wages have steadily decreased. Considering the ethnic composition of these sectors,²⁸⁶ it can be added that protection of Russian-speaking population went well beyond the subsidy of consumer goods. By doing so, Uzbek economists help prevent the emigration of skillful Russian-speaking population. Otherwise, the economy and political stability of Uzbekistan would have shattered.

B. FUTURE OF UZBEKISTAN

Despite Uzbek economists' confidence in the prospects for continuity of political and economic stability not only in Uzbekistan but also in the greater Central Asian region,²⁸⁷ the future of Uzbek economy seems uncertain because of the limits of agricultural sector. Figures in Table 5.5 show that agriculture is the backbone of Uzbek economy. Agriculture, on the other hand, has been dominated by cotton since the end of 19th century. Cotton exports, for example, account 60 to 75 percent of total exports and cotton production provides an important source of employment.²⁸⁸ However, cotton cannot support Uzbek economic system any longer.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 124.

²⁸⁶ Russian-speaking population makes up 38.1, 25.4 and 20.4 percent of the labor force of scientific, administrative and industrial sector, respectively. Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 43.

²⁸⁷ According to EMWL Magazine, in his first interview, Utkur Sultanov, the new prime minister of Uzbekistan, talked in confident tones about the success of his country's approach to privatization and the prospects for political and economic stability in the greater Central Asian region. In "Uzbekistan," Euromoney World Link Magazine (March/April 1996).

²⁸⁸ "Uzbekistan annual cotton report of American Embassy, Tashkent," Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, June 19, 1997; "World of Information: Uzbekistan-Country Profile," Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, April 18, 1997; "Business outlook in Uzbekistan," EIU Business Eastern Europe, October 28, 1996.

Table 5.5 Shares of Sectors²⁸⁹
(as % of total)

	<u>Employment</u>	<u>GDP</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Agriculture	43.5	33	77.5
Industry	13.9	19	13.6
Others	42.6	48	8.9

Shortcomings of cotton economy, according to Professor Craumer of Florida International University, are the following:²⁹⁰

- (1) Food (meat, bread, milk, etc.) deficit as a result of extensive cotton sowing;
- (2) Lack or insufficiency of agricultural inputs and
- (3) Environmental degradation.

Although Uzbekistan traditionally is an agricultural country, it cannot supply its population with enough food. In 1990, consumption of meat was only 48 percent of the all-USSR level. Milk consumption was at 59 percent, eggs were at 30 percent, potato consumption was at 29 percent and fruits 64 percent. Moreover, there were regional differences in food consumption. Contrary to the expectation, the lowest food consumption could be found among rural population in 1990. Consumption of meat, for example, was the lowest in the Fergana valley (20-23 kg per person) and highest in the city of Tashkent (81.3 kg), while milk consumption was 144 kg in Andijan and 376 kg in Tashkent.²⁹¹ Since 1992, the government has reduced the area of cotton by 13 percent to allow for more food and feed crops although regional patterns of food consumption basically have not improved or changed.²⁹² Because of regional differences in cotton yields, the allocation of land to food did not consider the requirements of local population. For example, the area allocated for cotton in the Fergana valley remained more than the other regions though the Fergana much more densely populated than the others (Table 5.6). Thus more densely populated regions--Andijan, Namangan and Fergana--are allowed to sow food crops much less than the other

²⁸⁹ The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 269; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1995-1996 (London: 1996) 116; Michael Kaser, The Economies of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 6.

²⁹⁰ Peter Craumer, Rural and Agricultural Development in Uzbekistan, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995) 16-21.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 30-1.

²⁹² Ibid., 16, 31 and The World Bank, Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform (Washington, DC: 1993) 116.

regions. As it is observed by Tom McCray of University of Kansas, only the production of food and feed crops can alleviate the economic difficulties of peasants.²⁹³

Table 5.6 Cotton Production in Uzbekistan by Selected Regions²⁹⁴

	<u>Rural Population</u> per hectare of arable land	<u>Cotton Yields</u> centners of raw cotton per hectare.	<u>Cotton Area</u> as % of all sown area	<u>Harvest by Hand</u> as % of total harvest
Fergana Regions				
Andijan	6.7	28.2	54.4	76
Namangan	5.3	29.5	49.0	80
Fergana	6.5	28.9	46.3	93
Others				
Bukhara	4.3	24.0	52.6	81
Samarkand	3.8	26.9	25.2	72
Karakalpakistan	1.6	15.8	36.0	60
Khorazm	4.1	9.1	47.7	89

Additionally, as it is presented in Table 5.6, almost all the cotton in Fergana regions is harvested by hand-picking. A hectare of cotton harvest by hand-picking requires about 3,400 man-hours, while mechanized harvest of same amount can be completed in 500 to 600 hours.²⁹⁵ Perhaps, if there were not the ‘state order system,’ the lack of machines for harvest would not have been important. Nevertheless, under the current system, all the member of villages (yesterday’s socialist *kolkhozes* or today’s “private” farms) must work in the fields to pick cotton for a minimum wage which is also paid occasionally. According to an observer, in 1997, “Students, children, industrial workers, soldiers, clerks and drivers are still required to work in the fields picking cotton for a symbolic wage.”²⁹⁶

²⁹³ Tom McCray, 11.

²⁹⁴ Peter Craumer, Tables 2 and 5.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 20.

²⁹⁶ Ron Synovitz, “Uzbekistan: Little progress seen in agricultural reforms,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 25, 1997.

Results of this system in the Fergana valley are the following:

- (1) The peasants' violent discontent;²⁹⁷
- (2) An increase in the unemployment rate to 20 to 35 percent in the estimates of the UN;²⁹⁸
- (3) The UN Development Agency's plan to launch a special development project²⁹⁹ and
- (4) A substantial increase in drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe via Tajikistan-Osh-Andijan-Tashkent.³⁰⁰

The goal of the UN Development Agency reveals the situation of Fergana valley more openly than other developments. Analysts and managers of the agency say that the probability of a civil strife and ethnic conflict in the region has been increasing as a result of recent economic, political and social changes.

Lack or insufficiency of agricultural inputs is the second limit of current agricultural system of Uzbekistan. Professor Craumer writes that the poor quality of fertilizers and defoliants and insufficient machinery not only cause loss in the harvest but also require excessive use of hand labor. Production of cotton harvesters, spare parts, mineral fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides has been falling freely since the late 1980s as a result of the socialist economic system. According to international observers,³⁰¹

[In 1997,] the lack of spare parts and replacement equipment for existing, overworked (planting, harvesting, and processing) equipment is becoming a major problem in Uzbekistan as well as in the rest of Central Asia. Planting (and replanting) often is delayed . . .

Their procurement requires inflow of Foreign Direct Investment for domestic production or hard-currency for imports. However, as it is mentioned in the previous section, both options cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, it seems that agricultural inputs cannot be increased in the short run.

²⁹⁷ "Business outlook in Uzbekistan," *EIU Business Eastern Europe*, October 28, 1996; Susan Sachs, "Central Asia's awakening; oil and Islam on Russia's frontier; crackdown on faith in Uzbekistan; strife fosters fear of Islam" *Newsday* (Nassau and Suffolk edition), August 22, 1997.

²⁹⁸ Ali Jalali, "Ferghana; conflict prevention," *Voice of America*, June 11, 1997.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ali Jalali, "Ferghana drugs," *Voice of America*, June 9, 1997; Andrew Meier, "Opium Highway: The legendary 'silk road' of Central Asia is open again," *Time* (February 24, 1997).

³⁰¹ "Uzbekistan annual cotton report of American Embassy, Tashkent," *Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire*, June 19, 1997.

Another problem of agriculture is environmental degradation. The desiccation of the Aral Sea and its hazardous effects are mentioned in Chapter II. Additionally, the quality, and therefore the productivity of soil has been decreasing since the 1980s because of over-irrigation, and over-planting of cotton. The yields in 1991-4, for example, averaged only 87 percent of yields in 1976-80.³⁰² Over-planting would be prevented by usual rotation of cotton and alfalfa.³⁰³ However, since the main hard-currency source is the export of cotton, the usual rotation is often postponed in order to produce and export more cotton.

Thus it is obvious that Uzbekistan cannot rely only on its cotton agriculture any longer. Also, because of the requirements of political stability, it cannot make any substantial change in its current economic system which depends on cotton. On the other hand, its political stability is again under threat because of its heavy reliance on cotton. Therefore, Uzbekistan must replace cotton with other sources in order to preserve its political stability.

Thanks to the geological and geophysical nature of Uzbek lands, natural energy resources offer an opportunity to remove cotton from its preeminent position. In terms of oil, Uzbekistan is one of the energy self-sufficient countries of the world since 1995.³⁰⁴ Until this time, Uzbekistan had imported 4.5 million tons of oil products from the Russian Federation in exchange for nearly half of its cotton crop.³⁰⁵

Natural gas seems much more promising than oil (Table 5.7). Currently, Uzbekistan exports around 210-320 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and gains \$150M-\$250M assuming that these countries pay for their gas purchases.³⁰⁶ Further utilization of Uzbek natural gas potential requires its export to other markets. For example, considering their poor energy resources and growing energy demands, Pakistan, India and China offer important opportunities for Uzbek natural gas exports.³⁰⁷ Moreover, perhaps not so much, but some of the natural gas deposits of Uzbekistan are found in the Fergana basin.³⁰⁸ Thus if Uzbekistan succeeds in the development of

³⁰² Peter Craumer, 11-7.

³⁰³ Ibid., 19.

³⁰⁴ Justin Weir, "From Silk Road to standard bearer," Institutional Investor (April 1997): 3.

³⁰⁵ Ben Aris, "Setting priorities," Institutional Investor (March 1996): 6.

³⁰⁶ Mary Page, "Gas set for key role in Central Asian republics," Petroleum Economist (September 1996): S24; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 1st quarter 1996 (London: 1996) 48.

³⁰⁷ Toufiq A. Siddiqi, "India-Pakistan cooperation on energy and environment to enhance security," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 3 (March 1995); Mamdouh G. Salameh, "China, oil and the risk of regional conflict," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1995-96).

³⁰⁸ A. D. Koen, "Uzbekistan seeking foreign partners for E&P projects," Oil & Gas Journal, August 5, 1996.

natural gas potential, Ferganis, Andijanis and Namanganis will be able to subsidy their fellow Russian-speaking countrymen without working in the cotton fields.

Table 5.7 World Natural Gas Reserves and Production in Selected Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>Rank</u> (according to reserves)	<u>Reserve, 1996</u> ³⁰⁹ (trillion cubic feet)	<u>Production, 1994</u> ³¹⁰ (trillion cubic feet/year)
The Russian Federation	1	1,750	21.50
Iran	2	740	1.12
Turkmenistan	3	535	1.20
Qatar	4	250	0.48
United Arab Emirates	5	205	0.91
Saudi Arabia	6	194	1.33
Uzbekistan	7	168	1.80
Iraq	13	110	0.11
China	20	59	0.59
Kuwait	21	53	0.21
Pakistan	23	27	0.62
Oman	24	25	0.15
India	25	25	0.59

Since Uzbekistan is a landlocked country, export of natural gas requires the construction of natural gas pipelines from Uzbekistan to customer countries or to seaports near to customers. In November 1996, after concluding a number of agreements, Uzbekistan took the first step towards the construction of a gas pipeline from Uzbekistan to Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. The agreements were signed by the government of Uzbekistan, Uzbek national gas, oil and pipeline companies, Delta Oil Company of Saudi Arabia and United Oil of California (Unocal).³¹¹

However, the future of this pipeline seems problematic because of perceptions of some influential Russian economic and political analysts. For example, in March 1997, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*

³⁰⁹ United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 1996, "Russia: A Country Analysis," and "Turkmenistan: A Country Analysis" at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu>; M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia (Washington, DC: INSS, 1996) 56.

³¹⁰ United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 1996, and Mary Page, "Gas set for key role in Central Asian republics," Petroleum Economist (September 1996): S24.

³¹¹ "Unocal signs agreements for Uzbekistan oil and gas, pipeline infrastructure studies," Unocal World News Release, November 4, 1996, at <http://www.unocal.com>.

published an advisory report about foreign relations of the Russian Federation. The report speculated that the government of the Russian Federation should take all measures necessary--including the destabilization of Central Asian, Caucasian, Baltic states, and Ukraine--to prevent the developments supposedly hostile to the Russian Federation. According to the authors of this report, the Russian-speaking populations in these countries should be used for destabilization.³¹² Although the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation denounced this report, the possibility of destabilization will continue to be taken into account. As was said by Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, "Because in politics, intentions are always a variable quantity. But potentials are constants."³¹³ "What are the sore spots between the two countries [Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation]?" asks a writer of a Russian daily. Then, she explains that,³¹⁴

The course Tashkent has charted toward oil independence and the implementation of a program for domestic auto manufacturing are pushing Russia out of its age-old positions in the Uzbek market. Another important factor is transportation lines. Lacking access to the sea, Tashkent has been carrying out foreign-economic activity through one Ukrainian and two Russian ports-Ilyichevsk, St.Petersburg and Vladivostok. But today not all roads lead through the territory of Uzbekistan's Slavic neighbors. Tashkent is seeking alternative routes to the West and the East.

Perhaps, the feasibility of Uzbek gas exports to Pakistan by way of St. Petersburg, for example, may be evaluated. It is certain that transportation costs of this route will be too high so those potential customers in South Asia may try to find other solutions to their energy problems. Pakistani academics' proposal for the redesign of regional borders to link Pakistan with Central Asian countries may be taken as a sample of other solutions.³¹⁵

In conclusion, the continuity of economic progress of Uzbekistan requires the replacement of cotton with natural gas in Uzbek economy. Only by doing so, "growing tensions," and therefore probability of ethnic conflicts can be reduced. Otherwise, disastrous developments cannot be avoided.

³¹² Paul Goble, "A recipe for disaster," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 1, 1997.

³¹³ "A minister the opposition doesn't curse," The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVIII, No. 39 (1996): 22.

³¹⁴ Sanobar Shermatova, "Moscow and Tashkent resume dialogue," The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVIII, No. 32, (1996): 25.

³¹⁵ Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, "Afghanistan and Central Asia :Mirrors and models," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 7 (July 1995): 617.

VI. CONCLUSION

The facts presented within the thesis make it clear that Uzbeks, as a people, have been living on the Uzbek lands since the 6th century. Therefore, they rightfully claim that they are the owner of Uzbekistan. The existence of the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan since 1865 cannot diminish their claims. Quite the contrary, as we observe from the past, the existence of Russian-speaking population caused the uprisings of Uzbek peasants after bloody, but unsuccessful resistance to Russian occupation.

One important characteristic of the uprisings was their rapid elevation to region-wide ethnic conflicts (Fergana-1916). The contrary was also seen in many other cases when ethnic conflicts changed into uprisings and resistance movements against the governments (Fergana-1989 and Osh-1990). Thus uprisings and ethnic conflicts intertwined in almost all of the cases. Another characteristic of the instabilities between 1865 and 1990 was a number of common causes: unemployment, hunger, dispossession and excessive exploitation of the Uzbek peasants. Since the losses of peasants were the gains of non-Uzbeks in the early economic systems, rebellious peasants' targets in the uprisings included non-Uzbeks and their possessions. Arrogant attitudes of non-Uzbeks toward the Uzbeks also enhanced the probability of their inclusion as targets. The third characteristic of these instabilities was the interventions of Russian armed forces on behalf of the non-Uzbeks (in every instance) and the rulers of Bukhara (in 1910 and 1913), Khiva (in 1874, 1875, 1877, 1915 and 1916) and Tashkent (in 1989 and 1990).

At the end of 20th century, Uzbekistan with its Russian-speaking population and economic difficulties remind one of the past. However, now Uzbekistan possesses promising opportunities for the maintenance of stability. Moreover, the evidences presented in this thesis indicate that only the continuity of stability, but without the growth of tensions among the peasants, is in the best interest of other states of the region and the Russian-speaking population of Uzbekistan. The greater comprehension of these current realities, the higher degree of stability in both Uzbekistan and the region will be.

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